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**EVALUATION OF U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
TO 1991/92 SOUTHERN AFRICA DROUGHT**

Country Report: NAMIBIA

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Prepared for:

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ACRONYMS

AID	Agency for International Development in Washington, D.C.
CCN	Council of Churches of Namibia
DESA	Drought Emergency in Southern Africa
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations
DRP	Drought Relief Program in Namibia
EC	European Community
ECU	European Currency Unit
EGSU	Emergency Groundwater Supply Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development
ELCIN	Evangelical Lutheran Church in Namibia
ELCRN	Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Republic of Namibia
EWFIU	Early Warning and Food Information Unit
EWFIS	Early Warning and Food Information System
EWSU	Emergency Water Supply Unit
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFW	Food for Work
FINIDA	Finnish International Development Association
FMLU	Food Management and Logistics Unit
FNDC	First National Development Corporation
FSG	Food Studies Group of Oxford University, Oxford, England
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GRN	Government of the Republic of Namibia
GTZ	German Technical Assistance Agency
ICRISAT	International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics
IMC	International Medical Corps
LIFE	Living in a Finite Environment Project
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
MAWRD	Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development
MeatCo	A parastatal meat packing company
MHSS	Ministry of Health and Social Services
MIB	Ministry of Information and Broadcasting
MLRR	Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation
M-Net	A private South African television network
MWCT	Ministry of Wildlife, Conservation and Tourism
MWTC	Ministry of Works, Transport and Communications
NDTF	National Drought Task Force
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NISER	Namibian Institute for Social and Economic Research of the University of Namibia
NORAD	Norwegian Aid Agency
NPC	National Planning Commission
ODA	Overseas Development Administration of the United Kingdom

OFDA Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance of the Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C.

OPM Office of the Prime Minister

QBasic A computer software package used by Peace Corps Volunteers

SACU South African Customs Union

SADC Southern Africa Development Community

SARP Southern Africa Research Program

SIDA Swedish International Development Authority

SWAPO South West Africa People's Organization

SWAWEC South West Africa Water and Electricity Corporation

Trans Namib A parastatal transport company

UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund

USAID United States Agency for International Development Mission in Windhoek, Namibia

WFP World Food Programme of the United Nations

WHO World Health Organization of the United Nations

I. GENERAL BACKGROUND¹

A. Country Overview and Political System

1. General Background

Namibia became independent of the Republic of South Africa on 21 March 1990, finally ending Africa's long colonial era. In the process, Namibia inherited severe economic inequalities, and deep political and social divisions. First, German imperial colonialism and then South African apartheid left Namibia with a highly segregated and skewed economy in which jobs, wealth and educational opportunities were reserved for the white minority. The dualistic nature of Namibia's economy and society has provided the black majority with few human, economic and financial resources.

Situated on Africa's southwest coast, Namibia is an arid country, bounded along the Atlantic Ocean by the Namib Desert and to the east by the Kalahari Desert. The northern bush-covered plains include the fairly high rainfall areas of Kavango and Caprivi. Namibia is sparsely populated, with a total area of approximately 320,000 square miles and only 1,400,000 inhabitants.

On a per capita basis, Namibia has the best developed water, railroad, power, road and air facilities in all of Africa -- even surpassing those of South Africa. Walvis Bay, jointly administered by Namibia and South Africa, is a modern, efficient seaport. Windhoek, the capital, and several other Namibian towns are developed to the point where they resemble small cities and communities in the American Southwest.

The urban population and commercial farmers are rich by African standards, while most rural blacks live in poverty. A rural black Namibian, for example, earns in a year what an urban black worker receives in two weeks and what an urban white Namibian might earn in one day. While most urban dwellers maintained their economic position during the past decade of near economic stagnation, rural blacks saw their per capita income share worsen by almost 20 percent.

Namibia was originally colonized by Germany as South West Africa in 1890. By any standards, the colonial rule was harsh and ruthless. South West Africa lost over 50 percent of its indigenous population during the colonial wars around the turn of the century. In 1920, following World War I, South Africa was given a mandate over South West Africa by the League of Nations. However, South Africa administered the country as its fifth province, imposing its own apartheid system in the late 1940s as it increasingly codified economic, social and political segregation and separation of racial groups.

¹ This evaluation was performed under contract to A.I.D.'s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (AEP-0085-I-00-3001-00, D.O. 9). A Statement of Work is attached as Annex H.

Finally, in the 1970s, the United Nations resolved that continued South African administration of South West Africa was unjust and illegal. Internal opposition to the South African regime became more vocal and violent, and with the independence of the Portuguese colony of Angola in 1975, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) stepped up armed incursions across Namibia's northern frontier. South Africa responded militarily, establishing a sizable military presence along Namibia's northern border and occupying large portions of southeastern Angola to prevent SWAPO from securing bases in-country. In 1988, after 22 years of bush war, South Africa agreed to withdraw from Namibia as a *quid pro quo* for Cuban troops leaving Angola. Subsequently, SWAPO won the 1989 general election in Namibia, which was supervised by the United Nations.

Notwithstanding a traumatic pre-independence history and the extremely unequal income distribution pattern, Namibia has created one of the best political structures and economic policy environments for broad-based, market-oriented, long-term growth anywhere in Africa. While Namibia's long-term growth prospects are favorable, given its rich mineral and fisheries resource base, it faces serious economic difficulties in the short-run as a consequence of the present worldwide recession, falling world prices for uranium, and lower quality yields from its coastal diamond mining and offshore fisheries.

2. Economic Conditions

Namibia's gross domestic product (GDP) was nearly \$ 2 billion in 1991. The World Bank classifies Namibia as a "lower middle income" county. Average GDP per capita is \$ 1,400, but this average obscures one of the most inequitable income distributions on the African continent according to the World Bank's measure of inequity scale. Only twelve countries worldwide have income inequities greater than that of Namibia, where five percent of the population -- predominantly white -- earns 70 percent of the GDP.

Namibia's economy is heavily dependent on a few primary commodities -- i.e., diamonds, uranium, copper, lead, silver, livestock and fish products -- which are exported. The mining, livestock and fishery sectors have accounted for 43 percent of GDP and nearly 90 percent of exports over the last five years. Formal sector unemployment has been estimated at between 23 and 38 percent, disproportionately burdening the black population. The democratically-elected Government of the Republic of Namibia (GRN) since independence has followed a pragmatic economic strategy and free market policies with the objectives of supporting formal and informal sector growth and redressing the inequities engendered by the apartheid era.

Growth of the Namibian GDP in 1991 was 5.1 percent, led by one-time expansions in the diamond and fishing industries. If these growth figures are removed from the national statistics, the remainder of the economy grew at a modest 1.6 percent -- or one-half the rate of the annual increase in population. These mixed results for 1991 followed two years of actual decline in real non-fishing GDP in 1989 and 1990. Inflation was eased somewhat, with Windhoek consumer prices up 10 percent in 1992, following a 17 percent rise in 1991. Inflation in Namibia and South Africa was linked during this period by common use of the

South Africa Rand as the currency. It remains linked in 1993, despite the recent introduction of the Namibian Dollar, through both countries participation in common monetary and customs unions. This is reinforced by the fact that the Namibian economy remains highly integrated with that of South Africa, where 75 percent of Namibia's imports originate from South Africa. Moreover, Namibia's excellent transport and communications networks are strongly linked with South Africa within the context of the South African Customs Union (SACU).

The Namibian economy has enormous potential for long-term growth, based upon its superior physical infrastructure and its extensive natural resource base, including diverse marine resources. Namibia can be a major conduit for trade with southern and central Africa, as shown by the temporary opening up of trade links with Angola during the 1991/1992 cessation of the civil war in that country and the modest use of Walvis Bay for exports from Zambia's copper mines. Capital intensive mining operations, beef and hide production, deep sea fishing and fish processing, and nature and wildlife-based tourism offer a wide range of outstanding economic prospects.

Historically, Namibia has had a very strong private sector orientation, despite having several large parastatal organizations, such as Trans-Namib, First National Development Corporation (FNDC), and the South West Africa Water and Electricity Corporation (SWAWEC). Parastatal activity is essentially confined to the low-cost housing, meat packing, transport, electricity and water sectors and the parastatals tend to operate profitably as though they were private entities.

The GRN has a clearly enunciated policy of reliance on the private sector to reactivate and sustain economic growth and it expects parastatals to continue to perform profitably. A positive environment exists for private sector activity and investment, world class management, production, marketing and technological skills exist in its well-developed mining sector. To a somewhat lesser extent, the same quality of know-how permeates the commercial agricultural and fishery sectors.

Namibia has a total public debt of \$354 million -- or 18 percent of its 1991 GDP. The South African Reserve Bank is Namibia's largest creditor -- \$325 million -- and has extended highly favorable terms, including a three-year grace period and an interest rate below the level of Rand inflation -- to Namibia for debts incurred during the colonial administration.

Although an annual budget transfer of over \$ 100 million no longer comes from South Africa, the national budget deficit for 1992 was under five percent of GDP. The GRN ran its first budget deficit in 1992/1993, but was able to finance it entirely from local borrowing. Although the Namibian Dollar has recently been introduced as the national currency, it, like the currencies of Swaziland and Lesotho, is still directly and indefinitely tied to the South African Rand. This arrangement provides strong monetary backing by African standards, international currency convertibility, and few foreign exchange limitations. In addition, the

GRN's fiscal and sectoral policies are generally frugal and supportive of rational, well-balanced economic growth.

3. Political Conditions

Namibia's multiparty constitution has been widely acclaimed as the most democratic and progressive in all of Africa, if not the developing world. It is built upon the United States and Westminster models, with checks and balances provided by a separate executive, a two-chamber legislature, an independent judiciary, and an entrenched chapter on fundamental human rights and freedoms. The ruling party -- SWAPO -- gained office through free nationwide elections in late 1989. The National Assembly is composed of seven political parties, with SWAPO holding 45 of the total 78 seats. Local and regional authorities and members of the second legislative house -- the National Council -- were elected in November/December 1992, with SWAPO controlling 19 of the total 26 seats in the National Council and nine of 13 newly-elected Regional Councils.

Political debate in Namibia is active and genuine. The judiciary has already dealt with numerous cases which have confirmed its independence. The few local lawyers generally are well-trained and experienced but there is a severe shortage of qualified magistrates. As a result, severe backlogs exist in the timely administration of justice as called for in the constitution. Internationally recognized human rights are respected and Namibia has an open and lively independent print media. Although television and radio are GRN operated, they function free of government interference. An independent board has recently been established to issue radio and television licenses to privately-owned organizations. M-Net, a South African private commercial television channel, operates in Namibia. A formal network of human rights, environmental and educational organizations, business associations, professional groupings and labor unions regularly pursue their interests without state intervention, and actively and publicly debate and discuss government policies.

In summary, Namibia can lay claim to one of the best economic and political enabling environments in the developing world. However, while the overall climate is positive, Namibia faces severe social and economic inequalities.

B. Emergency History

Prior to the onset of the post-independence drought conditions, the GRN had had no experience with the management of a national disaster of any kind. Although the country is drought-prone, the newly installed government had not had time to put in place specific institutional structures to either attempt to drought-proof the economy or to manage *ex poste* the national response to a serious drought before the 1992/1993 conditions were upon it.

Given this lack of GRN experience and institutional infrastructure to deal with disasters, all of the structures and strategies for managing the 1992/1993 drought had to be built up in the early months of the emergency and under pressures from local constituencies for assistance. *

In this regard, the GRN's ultimate response to the drought was as much an exercise in nation-building and showing that the government could function for the people as it was a response to the specific drought conditions.

C. Causes of 1992/93 Emergency in Namibia

The post-independence drought in Namibia, while serious for certain populations in certain areas, was far from the worst occurrence of poor rainfall conditions in recent history. The localized problems were caused by poor temporal and spatial distributions of rainfall mostly in the northern areas of the country where the majority of the population resides. As a consequence of poor rainfall, cereal yields were reduced significantly in some areas of the north and dry season grazing for livestock was problematic throughout most of the country.

While these facts are undeniable, it should be noted, however, that, even in "normal" years, Namibia uses export earnings from mining and fishing sectors to import the great majority of its annual cereals requirement. In this situation, even a 75 percent reduction in domestic cereals production in a given year, translates into only about a 20 percent increase in the country's requirement for commercial cereal imports. Since Namibia has a highly developed commercial network for the importation and milling of cereals and the distribution of cereal products -- e.g., maize meal and wheat flour -- additional imports of this magnitude can usually be handled in collaboration with the South African Maize Board and other exporters in South Africa from stocks on hand.

The exceptional factor in southern Africa in 1992/1993, then, was the pan-regional nature of drought conditions, not the specific conditions in Namibia. Had deficient rainfall conditions occurred only in Namibia, it is unlikely that any massive donor response would have been warranted because vulnerable populations could have been easily accommodated by the commercial purchase of supplementary cereals and their injection into the existing commercial food delivery network.

D. Namibia's Ability to Withstand and Manage the Disaster

1. Country Structure

a. General Characteristics

Namibia is one economy in Africa which is well-placed to withstand and manage the consequences of local drought and other disasters. Taken as a whole, it is a highly monetized economy with strong and effective commercial networks for delivery of basic foodstuffs and other goods throughout the country. Private sector firms are the backbone of Namibian commerce and are strongly encouraged by the government in its national growth strategy. And, the government itself has to date been remarkably prudent and conservative in its fiscal and monetary policies with the context of SACU.

Perhaps most importantly for the future, there are multiple growth points in the Namibian economy -- i.e., mining, fisheries, commercial agriculture, trade, tourism and public service employment -- which will tend buffer the economy against natural shocks like drought. Moreover, the economy has strong linkages with South Africa which further increase its capacity to deal with short-term emergencies.

In sum, unlike many other African economies, Namibia is not completely dependent upon subsistence agriculture to feed and otherwise support the majority of the population. While many people, particularly in the northern communal areas, are engaged in subsistence farming enterprises, the economy as a whole is sufficiently strong -- and unencumbered with debt -- to provide adequate financial resources for transfer payments from more privileged to more vulnerable groups in times of need. And, moreover, the government has strong incentives to implement such a short-term disaster management strategy as part of its longer-term economic strategy of poverty alleviation and redressment of the social and economic inequities of the colonial era.

The commercial agricultural sector in Namibia is highly productive within the natural resource constraints it faces. It is supported by government agricultural policies which for the most part reinforce competitive commercial interactions and do not appear to significantly distort local markets. Evidence of astute cereals supply management, for example, accumulated during the drought with local reports that, at no time, were local stores unable to provide consumers with basic foodstuffs at essentially stable prices. **In short, the major food security problem for vulnerable groups during the drought was not the scarcity of basic foodstuffs through existing commercial channels, but diminished consumer purchasing power among certain groups, primarily in the north of the country.**

Commercial farmers in the middle and south proved they could adapt quickly and correctly to drought conditions without much assistance from the government or the donors. Faced with declining forage reserves for their livestock, farmers made appropriate decisions to sell off excess livestock well in advance of a depletion of their forage resources and, thereby, brought their nucleus breeding herds and flocks through the drought with minimal losses.

b. Vulnerable Groups

It is extremely difficult in the Namibian economic and political context to clearly distinguish between that portion of the population which was made vulnerable to privation specifically by the drought and that larger percent of the population which is simply poor, under-privileged and lacks adequate household purchasing power even in the best of times.

In this regard, there are several factors to consider:

- Income distribution in Namibia is inequitable irrespective of the impacts of drought or other natural disasters. This means that many households, particularly in the northern communal areas, often lack adequate purchasing power for even basic commodities because they do not have regular employment or reliable income flows.
- Namibia is a food deficit country in terms of domestic production and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. The large majority of basic foodstuffs are imported into Namibia even in "normal" crop years. This means that even a major drought-induced crop failure in Namibia does not automatically translate into a situation where most Namibians, even in the more remote areas of the country, do not have access to food through the existing commercial food distribution system at reasonable prices.
- Political decisions about food aid and definition of vulnerable groups were obviously complicated in 1992 by the unfortunate convergence of drought conditions and election campaigning for the election in November/December and by the decisions of some donors to "reward" the Namibian government for its generally positive performance since independence. In this respect, both the GRN and certain donors used the drought to further political objectives quite unrelated to the actual requirements for drought relief per se.

The tough political and economic problem of precisely defining drought-vulnerable groups in the present Namibian context -- particularly when the incumbent government had essentially no experience in disaster management and was encumbered with political debts to the disadvantaged majority population -- was resolved by making several convenient decisions. These decisions had consequences for effective drought management in 1992/1993.

First, the GRN -- with the support of some donors and NGOs -- adopted very broad definitions of vulnerable groups. This, in the opinion of the evaluation team, led directly to an initial gross over-estimation of the sub-populations at risk from the drought and their food needs. The definition of such a large number of "vulnerable" groups and the emphasis on defining vulnerability in terms of individual, not household, characteristics greatly complicated the logistics for free food deliveries.

Second, the GRN -- and the donor community -- analysts never really arrived at a common and sharply delineated definition of Namibia's structural food deficit -- i.e., that deficit that Namibia should be expected to cope with as within the "normal" range of temporal and spatial distributions on annual rainfall and the subsequent performance of the domestic agricultural economy -- versus any deficit in available food stocks caused by truly exceptional droughts. Since no common set of criteria were established to determine what constituted the structural deficit and what constituted an exceptional demand on the food system, there was no technical or economic basis for determining how much additional food should be imported

as drought relief -- i.e., over and above stocks which could have -- and, in our opinion, should have -- been handled through normal commercial channels. It appears that individual donor decisions about the appropriate levels of food aid were made primarily on political grounds.

The inability -- or reluctance -- of government and the donors to carefully distinguish between Namibia's long-term structural food deficit and any exceptional short-term shortage specifically attributable to the drought effectively opened the door for a number of largely unproductive debates about what types and quantities of food were actually needed for drought relief. And, more importantly, it begged the question of whether all of the additional food requirements could have -- and should have -- been supplied through existing commercial channels, without setting up expensive and temporary extra-commercial delivery systems run by the NGOs.

Third, the lack of precision in identifying groups made vulnerable by the drought and defining their specific needs led directly to government promotion of a number of activities under the rubric of emergency drought relief which, in retrospect, were probably ill-advised. Among these activities were the wide-scale drilling of new boreholes in ecologically-fragile areas and the hasty implementation of a number of FFW projects of dubious value to either the populations at risk or the long-term development of the country.

c. Agricultural Policies

According to the GRN's summary report on the 1992/1993 drought relief effort, the twin objectives of the agricultural program were to:

- Preserve as many livestock as possible while pursuing measures to relieve the natural resource from the pressures of overstocking; and
- Provide farmers with an adequate supply of seeds to secure food production during the next rainy season.

The drought aid package was based on the following principles:

- Aid must be adapted to the specific needs of farmers in specific regions;
- Counter performance is a prerequisite for qualifying for aid -- i.e., farmers had to reduce stock numbers as a condition for accessing the services under the scheme;
- Aid offered is only a temporary but vital relief that must not create dependency; and
- Natural resources, even if privately owned, are national assets and must be treated as such.

For the period up to June 1993, the GRN spent Rand 58,600,884.87 on its drought aid package, mainly for households in the communal farming areas of northern Namibia. The major activities under the package included:

- A livestock marketing scheme providing subsidies to encourage increased offtakes of cattle and small ruminants from areas affected by drought;
- Purchase by government of several large farms for use in sustaining core herds owned by farmers from the communal areas;
- Efforts to procure fodder and licks for animals owned by a total of 16,491 farmers, largely in communal farming areas;
- Provision of a subsidy on karakul pelts to encourage sheep farmers in southern areas not to sell off their breeding stock during the drought;
- Distribution of inorganic fertilizers and seeds -- maize, sorghum, millet, peanuts and assorted vegetables -- to farmers in the communal areas; and
- Provision of custom ploughing services for farmers in northern areas.

According to the officials in the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development (MAWRD), the impacts of the specific drought interventions undertaken in 1992/1993 were still being evaluated by government and no firm conclusions had been reached as to their impacts on vulnerable groups.

Initial impressions of those officials interviewed were that subsistence farmers and more traditional livestock owners in certain northern areas of Namibia appear to have reacted less well to the onset of drought conditions than their commercial counterparts further south. Ironically, government officials told the evaluation team that there were some preliminary indications that some household stocks of millet and sorghum in the north may have been drawn down to lower than prudent levels during 1992 as the result of the unfortunate convergence of a pre-existing government cereal purchasing scheme and pre-election campaign activities.

The unusual situation arose because the government had in place of program to buy up millet and sorghum stocks from farmers in northern surplus production areas for redistribution to neighboring deficit areas. This program was moderately successful in that it provided incentives for certain farm households to sell off some of their on-farm cereal stocks in the months prior to and immediately after the onset of drought conditions.

Cereal sales under the government's program, which appeared rational to farm households with surplus stocks through early 1992, might suddenly have looked less than prudent later in

the year had not new incentives for cereal sales been introduced through the behavior of some politicians during the election campaign.

Apparently in mid and late 1992, small groups of politicians created a false sense of security in certain areas by telling rural residents that, in the event of serious drought, the government would be providing them with free food. These unfounded declarations apparently convinced some households with adequate cereal stocks to sell them off at the good prices being offered by government. They apparently thought they could obtain financial benefits from sales and still obtain free food from the government should they begin to run out before the 1993/1994 harvests.

Other than this one instance cited by MAWRD officials themselves, the evaluation team found no analyses to show that government agricultural policies specifically adopted in support of drought mitigation greatly affected the situation either positively or negatively.

In the broader context of national agricultural development, the government appears to have taken some positive steps, in collaboration with the regional SADC program, toward strengthening agricultural research activities in the communal grain producing areas in northern Namibia and in introducing new varieties of millet and sorghum to farmers. The government is also in the early stages of mounting two projects aimed at improving the management of natural resources, supported by USAID and GTZ respectively.

d. The Food Security Scenario

As stated above, Namibia has a structural cereals deficit defined in physical production terms but also has ample financial resources to import all the food it normally needs through existing commercial channels. Text Table 1 below summarizes the Namibian cereal supply/demand situation as forecast for 1993/1994 as compared to the situation for 1992/1993.

Under the current food balance scenario, Namibia produced an estimated 16,400 metric tons of millet and sorghum in the 1992/1993 drought year and is forecast to produce 43,400 metric tons of the same cereals in 1993/1994. Carryover stocks in 1992/1993 were estimated at 8,700 metric tons versus only 1,000 metric tons in 1993/1994. The country does not normally import either millet or sorghum.

Namibia produced an estimated 3,100 metric tons of wheat in 1992/1993 and is forecast to produce 6,300 metric tons in 1993/1994. Carryover stocks of wheat were 7,100 metric tons in 1992/1993 and are forecast to be 5.9 metric tons in 1993/1994. Total imports of wheat in 1992/1993 were estimated at 34,800 metric tons and are forecast to be 37,300 metric tons in 1993/1994.

Domestic production of maize, the most important cereal in the balance sheet, was estimated at 13,400 metric tons in 1992/1993 and is forecast to be 32,100 metric tons in 1993/1994. Carryover stocks for maize have grown from an estimated 300 metric tons in 1992/1993 to

15,500 metric tons in 1993/1994. And, total maize imports have fallen from an estimated 136,100 metric tons in 1992/1993 to a forecast 73,100 metric tons in 1993/1994, of which 64,000 metric tons are forecast to be commercial imports and 9,100 metric tons are concessional imports -- i.e., programmed food aid.

The overall in 1993/1994 Namibia appears to have ample resources to cover its structural food deficit if forecasts for domestic cereals production hold up well. Judging by commercial maize imports in 1992/1993, the existing commercial cereals import/distribution system has ample capacity to cover all of Namibia's domestic cereals use requirement, even in the absence of the forecast 9,100 metric tons of concessional food imports. (See cereal supply and demand forecast table on following page.)

2. Emergency Preparedness Capability

Namibia, as discussed above, appears to have had virtually no formal institutional capability in place at the onset the 1992/1993 drought except a nascent Early Warning and Food Information System (EWFIS), developed since mid-1991 with funding from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and technical assistance from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

There was some accumulated experience within the government and the local non-governmental organization (NGO) community in dealing with the problems of resettling refugees returning after the conclusion of Namibia's independence struggle. This was particularly true in the case of the Council of Churches in Namibia (CCN), which had been working with United Nations agencies on resettlement activities.

In the context of disaster preparedness, however, the 1992/1993 drought was really the new government's first experience in assessing the dimensions of and mitigating the impacts of a major national emergency. The experience was truly an exercise in learning by doing and by all accounts the government accredited itself quite well after some initial difficulties in getting organized, sorting out the authorities and responsibilities of government agencies, and negotiating the roles of these agencies vis-a-vis the local NGOs and the donor community.

Text Table 1
Namibia Cereal Supply/Demand Forecast for 1993/1994 Marketing Year
Compared with Estimates for 1992/1993
(in thousands of metric tons)

Category	Total Cereals	
	1992/1993 Estimate	1993/1994 Forecast
A. Domestic Supply	49.0	104.2
A.1 Opening Stocks	16.1	22.4
A.2 Production	32.9	81.8
B. Domestic Utilization	219.7	213.7
B.1 Food Use	192.3	180.2
B.2 Feed and Other Uses	5.0	11.0
B.3 Closing Stocks	22.4	22.5
C. Exports	0.2	0.9
D. Total Imports (B-A+C)	170.9	110.4
E. Net Imports (D-C)	170.7	109.5
E.1 Commercial Imports	139.6	94.9
E.2 Food Aid Requirement and/or Concessional Imports	31.3	15.5
F. Population (000s)	1,444	1,490
G. Per Capita Food Use (kilograms per year)	133	121

Source: Namibia Early Warning Bulletin of 29 October 1993 issued by the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development.

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II. DESIGN OF RESPONSE

A. Needs Assessment

1. Host Government and United Nations Agencies

The GRN's needs assessment for the 1992/1993 drought was contained in the text of its Policy Paper on Drought and Plan of Operations issued in May 1992. The principal conclusions of the government's needs assessment are reported to have come from a needs assessment conducted by a team of FAO/World Food Programme (WFP) specialists in late March 1992.

The government's needs assessment provisionally identified around 60 percent of the Namibian population in the communal areas as being at risk from the drought. This amounted to some 625,000 persons, of whom 250,000 persons were identified as being in vulnerable groups. These groups were initially identified as comprising **children under five and pregnant or nursing mothers within communal areas.**

The needs assessment went on to state that:

"Within the broad context of drought affected vulnerable groups in Namibia, certain households which have suffered or are likely to suffer disproportionately from the current drought can be identified. These include the households of farm workers and their families particularly those who are likely to be laid off to the drought and thus will not have access to either food or income from the farm which currently employ them. A second group of households are those, both in rural and urban areas, without access to reliable sources of income, remittances, pensions and farm labor. A third group in the category would be the considerable number of female-headed and/or single-parent households."

The GRN, after identifying the population at risk and the vulnerable groups within that population, went on to estimate food needs for these populations and to indicate other non-food activities to be initiated. The initial food needs were estimated at 60,000 metric tons, in addition to that which the affected population would be able to purchase for themselves. This estimate was reportedly supported by the FAO/WFP Mission, and included 16,800 metric tons of maize to be provided to the vulnerable groups and about 10,000 metric tons of cereals for FFW activities. Supplementary food was also requested in the form of 1,800 metric tons of dried skimmed milk for vulnerable groups, and beans, canned fish and vegetable oil for FFW activities.

Non-food activities proposed for drought mitigation included the crop and livestock assistance discussed in Section I.D.1.c. above, health and nutrition activities, and implementation of a rural water supply program.

2. USAID and Other American Agencies

Concurrent with the formulation of the GRN/FAO/WFP needs assessment in March/April 1992, the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) of the Agency for International Development (AID) mounted its own independent needs assessment mission in Namibia. After reviewing the food security situation in the country, the OFDA mission concluded that:

"It is unlikely that there will be a major famine in Namibia. The country is deficit in cereals in normal years. It can be expected that the Government will be prepared to ensure that food imports will continue, possibly supplemented by donor food aid. Food stocks, at a national level, are therefore not likely to be a problem. However, it is likely that a number of families will not have sufficient income to purchase enough food to meet their normal nutritional requirements and targeted feeding will be needed."

It went on to recommend that:

- Donors should consider supporting a six-month emergency food aid intervention targeted towards the most vulnerable groups most seriously affected by the drought. WFP's estimate of 250,000 beneficiaries is a good approximation of the number of people most affected by the drought (about 17 percent of the total population). The team cautions against a much larger program than this because of the limited capacity of the existing WFP/CCN/GRN structures for implementing and managing food programs.
- Donors should respond to the forthcoming UN appeal for an estimated 60,000 metric tons of maize for general and targeted feeding and approximately 2,000 metric tons of special supplementary foods. Wheat, if provided by donors, could be monetized to raise funds to support emergency food programs. Donors should also be prepared to provide supplementary foods in the form of milk or pulses.
- Donors should consider providing additional funding of technical assistance to WFP, selected NGOs, and other potential implementing partners, to strengthen the existing mechanisms and structures.
- In the area of targeting, the main potential food donors (USAID, WFP, EC) should work with the appropriate GRN officials to come up with mutually acceptable criteria for targeting any emergency food aid interventions. Social workers and churches could assist in identifying vulnerable groups.

- **Donors should consider supporting a food coupon program funded by a monetization program. Such a program would rely on the already developed commercial supply programs and would not disrupt normal commercial markets. The team believes it would be useful for WFP to undertake a short-term study to determine the feasibility of implementing such a program.**
- **Donors should look into the cost/usefulness/viability/need for fish in supplementary feeding programs either in Namibia or elsewhere in the region.**
- **Intensive vegetable gardening using hand-watered irrigation should be encouraged in the Kavango region. If necessary, vegetable seeds could be provided to needy farmers by the GRN or donors.**
- **Should Zambia need to import food into the port of Walvis Bay and through Namibian roads, donors should reinforce the bridge into Zambia.**

With respect to water supply needs, the OFDA mission concluded that:

"The Department of Water Affairs has a shortage of hydro-geological and geophysical expertise in their regional offices. This is a severe impediment to responding quickly to drought emergencies in the field. There is an immediate need for staff for the next year.

Several communal areas will be out of drinking water in the very near future due to dry wells or increasing salinity of the groundwater (i.e., central Owambo region). In response, the Department of Water Affairs is planning an emergency drilling, water transport and pipeline extension program. Water tanks, water trucks, water trailers, 5,000 to 7,000 liter water bags and water piping will be needed immediately."

It went on to recommend that:

- **Donors should consider interventions in the water sector which are cost-effective and locally available. The UN left Namibia a number of vehicles, many of which could be used to assist in the relief effort, especially in the water sector. For example, placing a water bladder on a flat bed truck is certainly less expensive than a new water truck and just as efficient.**
- **The capacity of Namibia's private sector to drill wells should be explored.**
- **Any intervention in the water sector should be well coordinated among donors to ensure the most efficient use of donor resources in the relief effort.**

With respect to health and nutrition needs, the OFDA mission recommended that:

- Donors should use existing health clinic networks to provide supplementary feeding for families of infants and children identified as malnourished and for lactating and pregnant women.
- Donors should strengthen growth monitoring systems for infants and children by providing technical assistance and training workshops to health clinic staff.

With respect to programs for livestock, the OFDA team concluded that:

"Rural small-scale Namibian farmers are at risk of losing a significant portion of their livestock holdings due to the drought. Programs to reduce the size of herds should be implemented immediately before many farmers lose a substantial amount of the value of their herds."

The team went on to recommend that:

- Donors should support the reduction in herd size as the most cost-effective method for farmers to survive the drought while maintaining some financial stability.
- Donors might consider working with GRN authorities on appropriate offtake programs which would give herders cash for their animals before their condition becomes so bad that they cannot be marketed. By providing cash to farmers, such programs will keep farmers in the marketplace and limit disruption of the economy.
- Donors should work with the GRN to develop a program which preserves good breeding stock for recovery after the drought. Once grazing conditions improve, the GRN and donors should assist farmers with re-stocking herds from this stock.
- Technical assistance should also be considered to improve the marketing of livestock for communal farmers.

With respect to the role of NGOs in the drought relief program, the OFDA team concluded that:

"The CCN has proved to be an effective channel for relief assistance and should be utilized by the donor community as the major conduit for getting relief commodities to the most vulnerable groups in Namibia."

Finally, with respect to the role of the donors in drought relief, the OFDA concluded that:

"Donor assistance will be vital to the success of the drought relief program in Namibia. Assistance is needed with both relief commodities and the operations and management of relief programs."

It recommended that:

- Donors should channel relief food through existing mechanisms. Strengthening and expanding existing programs, such as WFP's FFW program, would be a cost-effective and efficient method of providing drought relief and would avoid setting up a welfare system and possible dependency on food aid.
- Donors should consider providing technical assistance to WFP, selected NGOs (like the CCN), and other potential implementing partners to strengthen the existing mechanisms and structures.
- It can be expected that the drought will have the greatest impact on the communal farmers who make up the majority of the population. Donors should focus their relief efforts on mitigating the impact of the drought on this and all vulnerable groups.

B. Description of the Response for the Drought Relief Program with the Magnitude and Type of Resources Provided

1. Host Government

a. Organization of the Response

By April 1992, the GRN, through a special Cabinet Committee on Drought and with technical support from United Nations agencies, set in motion contingency measures that culminated in the drawing up of a national Drought Relief Program (DRP). The DRP encapsulated the following objectives:

- To ensure that human lives are not lost through famine;
- To bring relief assistance to, and reduce the suffering of, the affected populations;
- To limit economic damage by providing some measures of safety net and compensation, however modest they may be, to agricultural producers, both commercial and communal;
- To minimize the environmental damage arising from the drought; and

- To develop the institutional capacity and national preparedness that would enable Namibia to manage future natural disasters effectively.

A National Drought Task Force (NDTF) was constituted in May 1992 and charged with responsibility for running the relief operation as well as laying down the foundations for future disaster management. The NDTF, whose members were drawn from government department and UN agencies, comprised the following units:

- The Design and Management Unit; The Vulnerable Groups Unit; The Emergency Water Supply Unit; The Livestock and Crop Unit; The Transport and Logistics Unit; The Donors and NGOs Unit; The Information and Public Relations Unit; The Monitoring and Evaluation Unit; and The Food for Work Unit.

Each Unit of the NDTF was headed by a senior government technician who, in liaison with the Regional Governors and staff, organized operational activities in the field.

Initially, MAWRD was made the focal ministry in the inter-ministerial coordination of the DRP, with the Permanent Secretary of MAWRD chairing the deliberations of the NDTF. Following a mid-term review of the DRP in February 1993, however, the focal ministry was switched to the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) under the Secretary to the Cabinet.

The day to day coordination of NDTF affairs was charged to a National Secretariat headed by the Under-Secretary in the OPM and staffed by two Namibians, assisted by two professional staff seconded from UNDP and two consultants sponsored by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) of the United Kingdom.

b. Budget Estimates

Initial estimates projected a need for Rand 171, 000,000 in GRN expenditures to cover all of the activities of the DRP. This level of projected expenditure posed a significant problem for the government in that the annual budget had already been prepared. Under contingency measures, therefore, the budget was revised and each government ministry was asked to prune its anticipated expenditures to contribute to a central DRP emergency fund, which eventually totaled Rand 120,000,000.

On 15 May 1992, the President launched a Special Appeal for donor support to complement the national resources being provided. The response, in pledges and/or actual disbursements of cash, food aid and technical assistance, was good. An emergency budget, therefore, was finalized as shown in Text Table 2. Under the emergency budget, anticipated expenditures were Rand 171,228,000 (\$ 59,454,000 at the 1992 exchange of \$ 1.00 = Rand 2.88).

c. Activities Under the DRP

Under the DRP, the three key activities were the food distribution, the livestock and crop subsidy scheme, and the emergency water supply program.

(1.) Food Distribution

Within two months of the commencement of relief activities under the DRP, some 842 metric tons of food had been distributed in rations of 12.5 kilograms of maize and two cans of fish per recipient per month to 67,400 beneficiaries.

The official GRN policy was that there would be free food distributions only to those persons classified as being members of a vulnerable group, namely 250,000 of the 625,000 persons in the drought-affected population. The overriding rationale was to avoid creating a dependency syndrome among the population. Therefore, all able-bodied persons in drought areas requesting food aid were to receive it only through a FFW program devised and run by the local communities themselves through the regional governors and other field or grassroots development committees. The special expertise of the NGOs was to be tapped to provide the dynamism for the program.

**Text Table 2
The Emergency Budget of May 1992**

Budget Item	Estimated Cost in Rand
Food Aid	
-- Procurement of 60,000 metric tons of cereals for free distribution and food for work projects	37,800,000
-- Supplementary food for vulnerable group feeding	9,072,000
Logistics	
-- Milling cost at Rand 230 per ton for 60,000 metric tons	13,800,000
-- Internal transport, storage and handling of emergency food	24,918,000
Health and Nutrition Programs Livestock and Crops Programs	12,456,000
-- Marketing, lick and fodder subsidies	40,799,000
-- Seeds and implements	990,000
Water Programs	
-- Improvement and repair of existing boreholes and wells	11,500,000
-- Extension of piped water systems	8,400,000
-- Water tanker services, water delivery and community storage tanks	8,159,000
-- Emergency water supply and water quality monitoring	600,000
Funding for the United Nations	2,734,000
Grand Total for the Drought Relief Program	171,228,000

Persons covered by the FFW program were to include:

- Household members who had lost income as a result of the drought;
- Low income or subsistence farmers and their families; and
- Commercial and casual laborers made redundant as the result of the drought.

By the end of August 1992, all but 9,000 metric tons of Namibia's cereal import needs, estimated at 116,400 metric tons, had been met by food aid pledges and commercial imports. Local millers had made commitments to import and process 73,200 metric tons of maize and wheat and donors had pledged an additional 34,200 metric tons of cereals. The latter tonnage, while considerable, was short of the initial estimate of food aid required nationwide as put forward by the FAO/WFP Assessment Mission in March 1992.

(2.) The Livestock Scheme

In the main activity under this scheme, the GRN, starting in June 1992, provided farmers in drought-affected areas with an opportunity to sell off their livestock at guaranteed floor prices of Rand 120 for cattle and Rand 20 for small ruminants. This encouraged farmers to sell excess animals for slaughter, while keeping only those animals which could be carried on the deteriorating range resources. MeatCo, the parastatal meat packing company, was the executing agent under the scheme and it duly set up a system of auction sales, permit days and direct sales to abattoirs.

In addition to the slaughtering scheme, a second smaller program was set up to pay farmers a floor price for marketing Karakul lamb pelts in an effort to avoid their selling off their flocks of breeding Karakul sheep.

Between the start of the schemes for livestock and August 1992, a total of Rand 3,000,000 had been paid out to farmers for the marketing of 30,815 herd of cattle and small ruminants and Rand 600,000 was been distributed for the marketing of Karakul pelts. In addition, Rand 500,000 for fodder and lick subsidies and Rand 300,000 for lease of grazing, stock transport and veterinary services had also been made available.

(3.) The Emergency Water Supply Program

Provision of water was the most pressing challenge under the DRP according to the GRN. The situation for urban and rural water supplied worsened daily during 1992. Urban reserves stood at 22 percent of capacity at the end of August, as compared with 39 percent at the same period in 1991.

In the rural areas, depletion of groundwater resources continued, as water tables dropped and boreholes and shallow wells dried up. The situation was particularly serious in the east Owambo area, where some households had to bring water from as far afield as 60 kilometers.

Initially, provisions were made for the drilling and installation of 40 new boreholes and rehabilitation of 45 old ones nationwide. The total, however, was progressively increased to 1,500 boreholes under the DRP. The normal water development programs of the Department of Water Affairs and other rural development schemes were also accelerated.

Additionally, piped water supply networks in rural areas were extended to cover more communities. The old canal system flows of untreated water were extended to cater for livestock: mainly in the north where some grazing was available. Finally, the use of water tankers for emergency water delivery to schools, clinics and other public institutions was launched and budgetary provisions were made for the tankers to cover a total distance of 1,400,000 kilometers.

2. Multilateral and Bilateral Donors, NGOs and the Private Sector

a. Multilateral Agencies

In total, six multilateral agencies contributed resources for the Namibian drought relief program. The six multilateral agencies were FAO, UNICEF, UNDP, WFP, the European Community, and SADC. The WFP provided staff analysts and served as the principal conduit for the bulk of food aid offered to Namibia by the various donors. SADC provided food aid to the value of Rand 640,000 according to GRN reporting. Below are summaries of the activities of the other four multilateral agencies.

(1.) The European Community (EC)

The EC is one of the biggest food donors for the WFP and, by far, the biggest donor for European NGOs. Twenty to 25 percent of total EC food aid is allocated every year to NGO projects in developing countries. In the case of Namibia, the EC provided 10,000 metric tons of wheat for monetization valued at ECU 1,350,000. In addition, 427 metric tons of dry beans (ECU 218,000), 267 metric tons of dried fish (ECU 436,000) and 510 metric tons of cooking oil (ECU 436,000) were provided to the GRN for use in free feeding programs. Finally, a total of 861 metric tons of powdered milk valued at ECU 1,350,000 were supplied to WFP through the normal programmed food aid program.

(2.) The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

FAO, together with WFP, was foremost in alerting the GRN of the impending drought and advising it to make contingency arrangements. A crop assessment mission undertaken by FAO and WFP in northern, central and southern Namibia confirmed the occurrence of the drought. In addition, FAO, together with WFP, assisted the GRN in the preparation of its drought appeal document which was presented to the donors in May 1992. Further work by FAO on the document continued in Rome and FAO participated in the drought meetings in Geneva.

Through the Participation in Government Drought Task Force Project (TCP/NAM/2253), FAO provided information and advice to the GRN on water, livestock and crop production. The estimated cost of this activity was \$ 83,000.

Regarding water supply issues, a FAO consultant in rural water supply worked full-time on the drought in Namibia. The hydrologist undertook site visits in Herero East, Bushman districts, Kavango and Caprivi regions to assess the water situation, undertake hydro-geological surveys where necessary, and recommend possible solutions to mitigate the effects of the drought.

On livestock issues, two consultants focusing on production, range management and livestock marketing arrived in Namibia in August 1992 to visit parts of the country that were drought-affected. The findings were that the rangelands were severely overgrazed leading to serious environmental degradation in Kaoko, Damara and Nama districts. Recommendations were made to stem this downward trend.

In the northern communal areas, marketing of livestock was recommended as a de-stocking measure. The government subsidy given to farmers who sold their livestock was seen as an effective incentive to farmers. On livestock production, advice was provided on the feasibility and desirability of proposals to subsidize supplementary feeding of animals affected by the drought.

Through the FAO regional project for assessment of agricultural requirements related to drought (TCP/RAF/2257(E)) a mission assessed drought conditions in Namibia in July/August 1992. The mission evaluated the cumulative impacts of the drought on farming populations and reviewed and analyzed the livestock situation. A map of grazing conditions nationwide prepared by the mission was submitted to MAWRD.

The UNDP/FAO Early Warning and Food Information Unit (EWFIU) project played a major role in the management of the information system for drought relief in collaboration with Namibian Institute for Social and Economic Research (NISER), which conducted studies on household food security in drought-affected areas.

Efforts to develop further the network of weather stations to produce reports every ten days were stepped up in preparation for the 1993/1994 rainy season, particularly with reference to

the communal areas, which are grossly under-represented in the present network. The EWFIU also collaborated with the Health Information System operated by the Ministry of Health and Social Services (MHSS) with assistance from UNICEF.

In other activities, FAO had a project to provide a reliable vaccination service for the four northern regions -- Omusati, Oshana, Ohangwena and Oshikoto -- and for the rest of the northern communal areas. The output of this project was a fully equipped refrigerated room for storing veterinary medicines at a cost of \$ 28,000.

Finally, FAO provided seeds to drought-stricken farmers in Namibia. In the 1992/1993 crop growing season, FAO bought 84 metric tons of early maturing pearl millet seed for use by farmers in the northern regions at the estimated cost of \$ 70,000.

() The United Nation's Children's Fund (UNICEF)

UNICEF supported the implementation of the Namibian drought relief program from the beginning of the emergency. Initial contributions covered the drought assessment exercise, the drafting of the first appeal document and the preparation of the Plan of Operations document. UNICEF also provided financial and technical assistance to the NDTF for program planning and to the line ministries for support to nutrition promotion and health care for vulnerable groups, as well as the development of water and sanitation relief for drought-affected communities. In total, UNICEF allocated \$ 1,000,000 in assistance for drought relief activities in 1992 and an additional \$ 2,250,000 in 1993.

UNICEF support was provided in May 1992 for three Oxford University Food Studies Group consultants to assist the NDTF in the initial design and development of the drought relief program. One of the consultants in the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit was responsible for setting up a reporting system and training a Namibian counterpart. Additional support was provided to the NDTF for transport costs and acquisition of word processors/computers, photocopiers and a FAX machine.

Support was also provided to the Directorate of Rural Development of the MAWRD for implementation of FFW projects. Support included technical assistance from a UN Volunteer (financed by UNDP). In addition, UNICEF provided \$ 100,000 for non-food items, consisting of tools and materials, for the FFW program.

Due to the need to establish an efficient method of recording details of the increasing number of FFW projects, UNICEF funded the purchase of a computer and a UNDP communications expert who established a data recording system. UNICEF also funded two members of the ministry staff for specialized training in use of the data base.

UNICEF supported an agreement between the MAWRD and CARE International under which four CARE staff assisted in organizing FFW projects. UNICEF provided transport and

financial administrative support to the CARE staff to enable them to carry out their work with the FFW program. This support lasted for 10 weeks until the end of March 1993.

Finally, UNICEF provided funds to the Directorate of Rural Development for the printing of a FFW information booklet which has been widely disseminated and provides comprehensive information on the FFW program, detailing how to apply for project approval, monitoring and reporting procedures, etc..

The total estimated cost of UNICEF support to program planning activities during the drought emergency was \$ 604,000.

With respect to support for vulnerable groups and health system rehabilitation, UNICEF provided essential drugs to combat common drought-related conditions including diarrhoea, respiratory infections and vitamin A deficiency. In addition, growth monitoring equipment was supplied to health facilities to strengthen the program. In collaboration with WHO, support was given to the MHSS for nutrition training for more than 500 health workers.

Outbreaks of measles were reported in various parts of the country during 1992 and appropriate steps, including increased measles immunization campaigns, were undertaken. UNICEF provided additional measles vaccine for these efforts from its drought relief funds.

The Health Information System in Namibia has been streamlined in the past two years with support from UNICEF. This has provided useful information on the nutritional status of children as well as on the prevalence of various disease and health conditions in the general population. Updated health information is now available from all regions of Namibia.

UNICEF facilitated the provision of 840 metric tons of sugar and 150 metric tons of salt to be used in the production of 11,000 metric tons of fortified maize blend, which was used in the supplementary feeding program for children below five years of age, and pregnant and lactating women. The sugar and salt procured for the NDTF supported the feeding of 90,000 children.

The total cost of this component of the UNICEF program was estimated at \$ 853,000.

With respect to support to water and sanitation programs, UNICEF provided support to the Department of Water Affairs for development of rural water supply, focusing on sustainable low-cost and appropriate water supply and sanitation technologies for families in the four Owambo regions of Omusati, Oshana, Ohangwena and Oshikoto.

This program was initially limited to the following inputs costing about 500,000:

- The construction at 180 primary schools of ferro-cement tanks with 10,000 liter capacity and including the installation of gutters for collecting rainwater. During the drought period, these tanks facilitated the storage of water provided by water tankers. To date, 35 local builders have been trained in ferro-cement tank construction.
- The development of information, education and communication materials for rural extension workers on water conservation and treatment, including the preparation of a national water awareness strategy. Some 260,000 copies comprising four different pamphlets and six posters in seven languages have been printed and disseminated.
- Material and technical support was provided to communities for improving the water supply situation and gardening programs initiated by community members themselves.
- Introduction of new and appropriate technology to reduce the workloads of women and children in water collection in the drought areas by providing them with Aqua Rollers, which allow collection of up to 90 liters of water at one time using a "rolled" plastic container.

Following the receipt of an additional \$ 1,200,000 from donors in 1993 and in collaboration with the Department of Water Affairs, the Directorate of Rural Development, the Department of Education and Culture, and NGOs, the drought relief support package was expanded to cover the following activities:

- Construction of 10,000 and 46,000 liter ferro-cement water storage tanks, double pit latrines and sand filters, as well as repair of old water tanks, at a number of schools and health centers in the Omusati, Ohanguena, Oshana and Oshikoto regions using community mobilization techniques.
- Development of water facilities for communal use by inner-lining or completion of shallow wells, de-siltation of small earth dams, and technical aspects, including establishing Water Point Committees. Community involvement in de-siltation of earth dams and digging of wells was promoted under the FFW program.
- Support for the water and sanitation construction activities with appropriate information, education and communication materials on water usage, storage, conservation and hygiene, and also through establishing Water Point Committees.
- Field testing and evaluation of the Aqua Roller through the extension staff of the Directorate of Rural Development.

- Promotion of community mobilization, organization and participation in the development of water supply and sanitation infrastructure by involving school staff, government officials and selected NGOs in the programs.

(4.) The United Nations Development Program (UNDP)

The UNDP provided, under Project NAM/90/006 for advisory services, expertise to assist the GRN in establishing an emergency response mechanism. In collaboration with other UN agencies, UNDP provided the locus for the preparation of the main drought appeal document presented to the donor community. UNDP also provided expertise in the establishment of the NDTF and the preparation of the Plan of Operations for drought relief management and coordination.

In response to the GRN appeal, UNDP approved a \$ 500,00 Disaster Preparedness and Management project, initially located in the MAWRD and later relocated to the OPM. This project was implemented in two phases. The first phase was designed to support the GRN in the coordination and management of the drought. This provided the GRN with a senior disaster management expert with broad experience to advise on decision-making in drought management. Additional support was provided via the services of a press/information coordinator assisting the NDTF Secretariat in collating and disseminating information on the impact of the drought to policy-makers, local and international news media, as well as the donor community and NGOs.

In line with institutional capacity-building, the project funded training and workshops and procured equipment to strengthen the GRN' emergency structures. For example, a series of workshops were held in February 1993 to introduce the newly elected Regional Councillors to the GRN's drought relief program.

The second phase of the project focuses on disaster preparedness. It concentrates on policy formulation for disaster mitigation and the establishment of an institutional capacity for contingency planning, training, as well as implementation of strategies to combat future disasters.

From its Special Program resources, UNDP allocated \$ 50,000 to enhance the UN's support role in mitigation strategies and contingency planning by baseline data acquisition and monitoring the effects of the emergency operation. The project provided for administrative and logistical support to the UN thus complementing the disaster project.

Finally, at a cost of \$ 700,000, UNDP funded the FAO-executed project with the MAWRD for the establishment of an operational EWFIS. This project is linked with the SADC Regional Early Warning System for food security.

b. Bilateral Donors

The bilateral donors included: Canada, the Peoples' Republic of China, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Most of the bilateral donors made contributions of commodities, equipment and/or cash in support of activities like the rural water supply program. The commodity contributions are summarized in Annex E Table E-1. Where a bilateral donor contributed to the support of a particular non-food relief activity, the contribution is summarized below.

(1.) Sweden

On the basis of a formal request from the GRN through the National Planning Commission (NPC), the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) allocated the equivalent of Rand 2,400,000 in support of drought relief in Namibia. This support was financed out of unallocated funds for Namibia which, in 1992/1993, amounted to Rand 50,000,000.

The major portion of the SIDA funding -- Rand 2,000,000 -- was channelled through UNICEF for the following activities:

- Expansion of school water supply storage for rainwater;
- Harvesting in Owambo, Kaokoland and Namaland;
- Expansion of community initiatives for low-cost water source development;
- Development of low-cost "jetted" wells in Caprivi and extension of water pipelines in Owambo; and
- Technical assistance to regional authorities for the identification of feasible and appropriate water sources.

The remainder of the SIDA funding was used by NISER, in close consultation with the NDTF. The purpose was to support the establishment of the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit with the view to providing the NDTF with adequate information and making the administration of emergency relief efforts more efficient.

(2.) The United Kingdom

The ODA supported the drought relief program in three ways:

- By providing food aid through the EC and WFP;
- By providing support to NGOs involved in the relief effort in affected areas; and

- **By providing technical assistance to the NDTF and NISER.**

The United Kingdom shared the cost of 800,000 metric tons of cereals provided by the European Community for food assistance to the ten member states of SADC.

The ODA contributed 60,000 Pounds Sterling to The Rossing Foundation to support the costs of food distribution in Oshikoto, Oshana and Ohangwena regions. The operation covered 20 electoral constituencies with a total population of about 250,000. In addition, 47,000 Pounds Sterling were provided to support a seed multiplication scheme at Shanhana in northern Namibia and 32,000 Pounds Sterling were contributed to UNICEF for rural water supply projects in northwestern Namibia.

For a period of 12 months, ODA funded the assignment of specialists from the FSG at Oxford University to assist the NDTF Secretariat in the design and management of the drought relief program. In addition, the FSG provided a socio-economist to NISER for six months to work on drought-related food security issues. The total cost of the technical assistance provided was 194,500 Pounds Sterling.

c. NGOs

(1.) The Council of Churches in Namibia

Based on the experience gained in previous food assistance programs, including nationwide FFW schemes, the GRN requested the cooperation of the Food Management and Logistics Unit (FMLU) of the CCN in management of the transportation, handling, storage and distribution of food aid as directed by the Secretariat of the NDTF. The agreement between the GRN and the CCN was signed on 18 September 1992.

Under the agreement, the FMLU worked jointly with the GRN in managing the distribution of drought relief food aid. The FMLU provided technical training at the regional, district and local levels to those involved in relief operations, in the areas of commodity management, transport, handling, storage and distribution of drought relief food. The Unit worked with other NGOs and the GRN in assigning zones of operation for the relief distribution and in developing the overall Plan of Operations for food distribution. The FMLU was represented and participated in various operational units of the NDTF, including the Vulnerable Groups Unit, the Design and Management Unit, and the Donor and NGO Unit, in addition to providing staff for the NDTF Secretariat.

The FMLU operated five main regional offices at Katima Mulilo, Rundu, Oshakati, Windhoek and Keetmanshoop for food distribution during the drought and coordinated activities from its headquarters in Windhoek. It also managed a number of other sub-regional depots jointly with government. The FMLU assisted with the management of vehicles during the emergency, including nine trucks with trailers. The amount of food handled by the Unit amounted to

approximately 4,000 metric tons turnover per month and the Windhoek warehouse frequently off-loaded up to 240 metric tons per day.

The FMLU, through the CCN, was represented at different levels in the overall drought relief effort and the CCN was also represented through the participation of priests, pastors and other religious and church leaders at the grass-roots level. These representatives often assisted with the targeting of beneficiaries and with the storage of drought relief food in localities where no regular storage facilities were available.

The FMLU, through the CCN, received donations from its member churches, including the Lutheran World Federation in Geneva, through staff secondment; Christian Aid (UK); the World Council of Churches, which channelled donations from various sources such as the Danchurch Aid and other European and American Churches. In total, some \$ 600,000 was donated to the CCN/FMLU for the drought program. Much of the funds were used to upgrade the FMLU's motorpool and equipment, to operate more efficiently. Other donors were the European Community and WFP.

In addition to direct food distributions, the FMLU worked with the Department of Rural Development in the MAWRD, which managed all FFW activities during the drought program. The FMLU was assisted by an engineer, seconded by the Lutheran World Federation in Geneva, in the management and logistics of FFW activities, as well as in the planning of more than 200 FFW activities nationwide.

(2.) The Namibian Red Cross

The Namibian Red Cross was involved in drought relief from August 1992 with activities centered in the Kunene Region. The distribution of free food started in September 1992 from stocks in both Khorixas and Opuwo and ended in June 1993. In addition, Red Cross staff were involved in five FFW projects in the former Damara region, from Spitzkoppe to Sesfontein.

A water protection scheme was implemented for six months in the Kaoko district and included installation of hand pumps as well as encasing of wells with concrete liners and lids and the building of protective walls around natural springs. This water source protection scheme was so popular that the Red Cross decided to extend the program beyond the end of the formal drought program until June 1994.

(3.) The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Namibia (ELCIN)

The ELCIN cooperated with the GRN and other NGO partners in drought relief activities, mainly in northern Namibia. As a special program, the ELCIN strengthened its transportation capacity in the San resettlement program area. It also launched a small project program, which endeavored to generate community activities toward income generation and local

infrastructure development. Special attention was also given to small scale water projects. The aim was to increase the number of such small scale projects to 50 by the end of 1993. This program is coupled with a training program in project planning and implementation as well as in financial planning.

(4.) Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Republic of Namibia (ELCRN)

In January 1993, the ELCRN imported four used heavy duty trucks for use in the drought relief program. The trucks were donated by the Lutheran World Federation in Geneva. The NDTF requested that the ELCRN concentrate its logistical and managerial activities in food distribution in the two southern regions of Hardap and Karas.

Initially, the intention was to station all of the four trucks in the south, but torrential rains that flooded parts of Omusati and Oshana regions in the north made it desirable to transfer two of the trucks to relief efforts in the Oshana and Caprivi regions. The third truck was also to be sent north but this was impossible due to a lack of spare parts for needed repairs. The fourth truck was kept in the south at Mariental. From December 1992, the ELCRN's warehouse in Mariental was used to supply food for the entire Hardap region.

In addition to food distribution to vulnerable groups, ELCRN organized eight FFW projects including vegetable gardening projects at six sites, a low cost housing project, and a community kindergarten. Other rehabilitation projects in vegetable gardening, goat re-stocking for small-scale farmers, and ostrich farming in communal areas are planned.

(5.) OXFAM Canada

In light of food available from Canada and pledges made to Namibia, OXFAM Canada agreed to supply 600 metric tons of beans and 144 metric tons of cooking oil to FFW projects, representing a contribution of Rand 2, 500,000. Because of its logistical capacity in the Okavango region, where it had been working since the early 1970s, the FFW management committee requested that OXFAM Canada facilitate implementation of the FFW program in that region. OXFAM Canada, therefore, undertook to facilitate the process of approval and implementation of 38 active projects by April 1993.

OXFAM Canada purchased 45 metric tons of millet, sorghum, maize, bean, groundnut, and pumpkin seeds for sale to farmers at low cost through community mobilizers in the region. OXFAM Canada also undertook to sell on credit 300 ox plows and hundreds of small tools for small-scale farmers. Finally, the organization agreed to support the drilling and installation of 12 boreholes on unutilized grazing land near the Okavango River and to provide training to communities in sustainable and sanitary use of these boreholes.

(6.) The Rossing Foundation

Following is the report of participation of The Rossing Foundation contained in the GRN's final summary report on the drought relief program. Because of its usually candid statements, it is quoted verbatim and without comment by the team:

"The Rossing Foundation was given responsibility for food distribution in the entire eastern Ovambo region. The population of the area is about 200,000 persons, of which 100,000 were registered for food aid. This figure was suspect in that many persons were registered who were actually not entitled to it under the established criteria. There were many problems with the registration in the first place largely due to the GRN's pledge that no one would die of hunger which left local people with the impression that everyone would be given free food whether they needed it or not.

Furthermore, the start of the food distribution exercise in Ovambo region coincided with the run-up to the regional elections, thus the whole business took on a strong political flavor. The local government officials were reluctant to rectify the initial misunderstanding despite the fact that some community members had been excluded completely from drought relief even though they qualified for it.

Due to lack of infrastructure, the NDTF was unable to charge the local communities themselves with the direct responsibility for deciding on who should receive food, a responsibility left to the regional authorities. Many angry scenes took place in front of the regional offices and warehouses. Most regional committees when faced with hungry and angry members of the community, simply registered everyone.

The initial food distribution recording system was a nightmare of accounting complexity, and it appeared that those who had proposed the system lacked a proper grasp of conditions in the rural setting. This situation was later rectified with the adoption of a more simplified system which was not aimed at vulnerable individuals as recipients of the food aid but rather at vulnerable households as recipients.

The Rossing Foundation was lucky to have installed a computer and also avail itself of the services of two young American Peace Corps Volunteers who computerized our whole operation in the region and thus we were in a good position to say exactly what had been distributed and to whom at any given time. However, in the whole period that we have been involved in this drought relief programme, we have never been able to issue a full ration as prescribed for there have always been some food items short on the menu.

Under the new system, food is now allocated to each region on a population basis. The councillor in each area is responsible for selecting the food committees, who in turn distribute the food according to the vulnerable households of whom they are aware. Records are kept by the communities who return them to the Foundation.

Rossing also distributes food to 40 clinics. The clinics identify the under-nourished children and issue food to parents from a small stock held by them. Only enough food for a day or two is issued and the family must return later if more is needed. This way the clinics can check to see whether the child is actually getting the food and its condition is improving. This is done with the support of the regional councillors who see to the allocation of the food to the clinics."

d. The Private Sector

According to GRN's reports, 20 private firms operating in Namibia had donated to the drought relief program by June 1993. Eleven firms donated an estimated 17 metric tons of dried, tinned and frozen fish. Seven firms made cash contributions and one firm provided 45,000 meals per month served in their own community centers.

3. USAID and Other American Agencies

United States government drought relief to Namibia in 1992/1993 amounted to \$ 10,900,000. In February 1992, the United States Department of Defense donated 3,000 tons of food rations left over from the United Nations sanctioned United States-led military offensive to free Kuwait. Although the donation, worth \$ 6,500,000, was arranged prior to the drought, the food was used to provide relief during the early stages of the emergency.

The core of the United States emergency response to the relief effort was a donation of 10,000 metric tons of maize costing \$ 2,580,000. This maize was channelled through WFP to support Namibia's vulnerable group feeding program.

In addition, USAID provided UNICEF with \$ 700,000 for non-food immunization and health/nutrition projects in Namibia under a Southern Africa Regional assistance package. OFDA donated \$ 51,350 to the Namibian Red Cross via the International Confederation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies for provision of vitamin A and food distribution.

OFDA also channelled \$ 709,571 through the International Medical Corps (IMC) for the rehabilitation as well as drilling of 40 boreholes in the Erongo and Kunene regions in collaboration with the Department of Water Affairs.

A total of \$ 64,485 was allocated from the American Ambassador's Self-Help Fund to the Department of Water Affairs to install water storage cisterns in various regions. The Disaster Fund allocated an additional \$ 25,000 to procure six truck-mountable water bladders for use in water distribution to rural sites.

The AID Southern Africa Regional Program (SARP) spent \$ 67,200 to procure 60 metric tons of Okashana I millet seed from Zambia for distribution to farmers through the Mahanene Research Station of the MAWRD. This procurement was facilitated under the SADC/ICRISAT Sorghum and Millet Improvement Program, funded by AID through a SARP grant.

The United States Peace Corps in Namibia undertook a special drought relief initiative to provide assistance in water supply and management activities as well as in food distribution at the community and national levels. The initiative was funded by OFDA with a budget of \$ 152,000 under which the services of 10 third-year Peace Corps Volunteers were provided to Namibia's drought relief program for ten to 12 months of service.

The drought relief Peace Corps Volunteers began arriving in Namibia in early October 1992 and after a brief orientation went to their posts. The initial eight Volunteers were in place by November 1992 and the final two reached their post in January 1993. Six Volunteers were assigned to the MAWRD's Department of Water Affairs as hydro-geologists.

Provision of these Volunteers enabled the Department of Water Affairs to fully staff the regional offices of its 14 Emergency Water Supply Units (EWSU). One of the Volunteers was assigned to Department of Water Affairs headquarters in Windhoek to assist in managing the EWSU program as a whole.

III. IMPLEMENTATION

A. Roles and Responsibilities

At the beginning of the DRP, the MAWRD was entrusted with chairing the newly-constituted NDTF. This arrangement soon revealed some basic organizational flaws; the principal one being that one line ministry could not always depend upon the full cooperation of the other line ministries in implementing the DRP. This deficiency was particularly true with respect to providing full budgetary resources for the DRP, as the other ministries sought to defend their own budgets.

A second problem was that NDTF unit members, although seconded from their own ministries to the NDTF, often viewed their first responsibilities as being to their own ministries, rather to the MAWRD as the DRP coordinator. And, finally, the leadership skills of the then Permanent Secretary of the MAWRD proved inadequate to the demands of the delicate coordinating role as the designated first among equals in the line ministries.

As a result of these problems, responsibilities for chairing the NDTF and managing the DRP were transferred to the OPM after the mid-review of the program in late 1992. This transfer generated a higher degree of commitment from the various NDTF units, as members were no longer only accountable to their own ministry but also to the higher authority of the OPM. Most GRN and UN officials agreed that this change was necessary if NDTF operations were to improve.

The WFP, however, contended at the time that the change did not improve reporting procedures and that they still were unsure of who was in charge of the DRP or the NDTF. WFP apparently believed that the MAWRD should have retained the chairmanship of the NDTF, even though this view was opposed by most of the other participants. MAWRD officials, on the other hand, were reported to have been fully supportive of the transfer because their situation was perceived as being leadership on paper with no effective sanctions if the other ministries did not fulfill their assignments.

One specific area of conflict within the NDTF structure was with respect to provision of transport for DRP activities. No single transport budget was set up and each ministry was expected to contribute transport out of its own budget vote. Not surprisingly, many ministries tried to keep as much transport as possible to themselves in order to protect their core work, and the distribution of food suffered as a result. This indicated the necessity of a single budget for transport for any future DRP.

According to the GRN's summary report on the 1992/1993 -- and confirmed by several donors and NGOs in interviews -- the Donor and NGO Unit of the NDTF did not function according to plan. The Unit officially met only twice between July and October 1992, instead of weekly as anticipated. As a result donor and NGO activities were not sufficiently coordinated, which no doubt contributed to the strained relationship between the NDTF and the NGOs.

In this regard, several donor and NGO representatives interviewed by the evaluation team indicated that they also felt that formal GRN/donor/NGO coordination mechanism was inadequate for their needs. The major donor agencies contributing or managing relief food contributions -- i.e., the United States, the European Community, WFP and UNICEF -- apparently resolved their operational difficulties by resorting to informal meetings and communications between themselves.

Many of the NGOs, on the other hand, reported that they were frustrated in the initial stages of the drought relief operations because the GRN did not appear to be particularly interested in the assistance being offered by them. Moreover, after September 1992, when the GRN and the CCN finally negotiated a major contractual role for the FMLU in food management and delivery, representatives of other NGOs reported that they continued to have considerable difficulty in securing GRN cooperation in resolving some of the operational problems they were encountering in the field with identification of qualified members of the designated vulnerable groups, in securing adequate transport, and in securing all of the designated

components for the multiple relief packages dictated by GRN planners. One of the NGOs reported that it had been deliberately excluded from DRP planning sessions after one initial meeting because its representatives had registered a plea for greater simplicity in the designation of vulnerable groups and had pointed out that the inclusion of up to eight different components in the relief food packages for the different groups would greatly complicate the logistics of food delivery.

The GRN report also states that:

"The lack of effectiveness of the Donor and NGO Unit could also explain a lack of information passing between the GRN and UN agencies. Both sides claim that the other was not transparent in its decision making and was biased in its reporting of institutional contributions to the DRP. The UN claims that the reports emanating from the NDTF did not fully express the role played by the UN agencies. There was also the feeling that there was little transparency in GRN decision making, despite the fact that in Namibia the small size of the population often results in greater than normal access to the government. Foreign experts in the NDTF even attended cabinet meetings!

GRN officials make similar claims regarding the UN agencies. The UN reports (including that of the Drought Emergency in Southern Africa (DESA) -- although others claim that the reports sent to Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) of the United Nations were agreed on jointly) -- apparently contained few references to the GRN contributions to the DRP but instead concentrated on UN agencies (reports were compiled as a result of UN agency contributions) and the GRN was often unaware of decisions reached in the closed meetings of the UN agencies. This situation can promote distrust on both sides, and it is important therefore to institute mechanisms which improve transparency -- all the more so when relationships are strained as they were between NDTF and WFP."

This respect to the implementation of the FFW program, GRN reports -- and evaluation team interviews -- indicated the following problems:

"The food for work programme suffered from many of the same problems as the vulnerable groups programme. Food for Work requires an even greater level of organisation at regional and local levels as programmes have to be designed and ratified, and the logistics involved in supplying the tools and materials required for these programmes often present greater logistical, accounting and reporting procedures. As a result the implementation of the programme was patchy, with little coordination between the organisations involved such as the Directorate of Rural Development in MAWRD, CCN, UNICEF, OXFAM Canada and the Red Cross. However, as the NDTF improved its coordination role during the DRP, the programme improved.

It can be said that FFW had little effect for much of the drought. This had grave consequences regarding the targeting of food aid, as able bodied people often did not receive aid which should have been channeled through FFW, resulting in a large section of the population who suffered the drought not receiving any direct aid.

Without going into all the historical details of FFW, a few problems will be highlighted. There was supposed to be a system of project approval by NDTF's FFW Unit. Well into the DRP many projects had been approved by CCN without anybody knowing -- as it turns out it seems that this luckily filled a hole in FFW policy. In some areas, Regional Government also pushed ahead with the programme without ratification; of course the food aid did not arrive. Again GRN control of FFW inputs and food (through CCN) was not good.

As with the vulnerable groups programme, institutional structures have now been developed and have valuable experience so that these problems should be largely avoided in the future. However, it should be made clear that coordination and clarity on the responsibilities of those involved in FFW is very important. This is because the distinction between FFW for drought relief and FFW for poverty alleviation/development is not always made clear, with the result that individual institutions may follow their own agenda on these issues as far as possible."

The NDTF Monitoring and Evaluation Unit report of February/April 1993 summarized the problems in role definition and coordination as follows:

"Many of the problems which have arisen in the implementation of the DRP have their roots in the poor coordination between ministries and between government and NGOs. This is not an easy problem to tackle. Different agencies have their own agenda and set of priorities. However, confusion is less likely when there is clear delineation of responsibilities. Sorting out these responsibilities in certain areas has been a time-consuming activity in the last year. These must be clarified and agreed at the beginning of future DRPs."

The GRN report to the SADC meeting in Harare in September 1993 summarized the situation as follows:

"Much has been learnt in Namibia regard these issues. Future DRPs are likely to be much improved in this respect, given the wealth of experience gained in disaster management. Institutional improvements were made in Namibia during the course of the drought, and if a permanent structure is put into place to manage future emergencies then coordination should significantly improve.

However there are some institutional arrangements which should be investigated since some types of conflict are unlikely to disappear even with the great amount of experience gained in Namibia. Foremost amongst these is the nature of the agreement between WFP and GRN. In emergency situations it is to be expected that governments cannot always fulfill the reporting requirements of WFP. It is essential that either these reporting requirements are interpreted less strictly, are made less stringent, or a forum is developed where these conflicts can be resolved. Maybe the UN resident representative could be more involved in this or an independent adjudicator. Quite possibly this problem is even more deep rooted. Maybe the whole issue of who is in control of food aid is at stake. Governments will never accept that they are not in charge, although practicalities result in food aid being primarily by the WFP. To illustrate, WFP only brought in food aid based on their own figures of vulnerable groups and their own decision making regarding the food basket. The GRN was not in a position to mobilise donors to satisfy their own figures of vulnerable groups. Hence the comment of one GRN interviewee:

"The Government felt as though it was the owner of the house, but wasn't in control of the mealtimes."

One hopes that both WFP and governments including that of Namibia can work out a framework which will enable both institutions to carry out their work in emergency relief without conflict. This time Namibia was fortunate in that a disaster was averted even though GRN appeals for food aid were not fully satisfied, and distribution of the aid that arrived was not all it could have been. It would truly be a disaster if these types of conflict occurred under worst conditions that were found in Namibia's recent drought."

In sum, then, it is obvious from the available reports and the results of evaluation team interviews that there were considerable difficulties during the planning and implementation of the DRP in, first, defining precisely the institutional roles of the main government agencies, multilateral agencies and the NGOs and, second, coordinating operations between the major implementing agencies. It appears to the evaluation team that these difficulties can be ascribed more or less equally to three factors: the newness of the NDTF/DRP mechanism to all participants; the personalities of the representatives of certain major players involved in the DRP planning and implementation process; and the absence of effective formal mechanisms for facilitating GRN/donor/NGO collaboration and cooperation.

These deficiencies appear to have been overcome in large measure as the drought relief operations proceeded. Although retrospective evaluations of the problems are valuable in the context of planning for future disaster mitigation mechanisms, they should not be stressed to the point that they obscure the major outcomes of the program. These are that most Namibians who were seriously affected by the drought appear to have received assistance in

various forms and via a variety of public and private support mechanisms and that no Namibian is reported to have died as a direct result of the disaster.

B. Coordination

As stated several times already, the 1992/1993 drought was the first major emergency faced by the GRN. One should therefore keep in mind that the government had little experience in dealing with such an emergency, and that the experience gained will, no doubt, significantly enhance future operations of this nature. In this regard, the GRN in its reporting drew special attention to the local government structures that existed at the onset of the drought. Apartheid under the South African regime had left weak institutions at the regional level, and the GRN had not been able to supplant these structures with democratic institutions before the onset of the drought. Most Regional Commissioners were political appointees at the onset of the drought. Only in November 1992 -- at the height of the drought relief operations -- were Namibia's first regional elections held. The new representatives invariably had little experience with drought relief measures. However, institutional stability at the regional level is now being consolidated and it is expected that any future role of local government in drought relief will be considerably improved.

Comments on coordination at various stages in the drought relief planning and implementation process are summarized below:

1. The Early Warning System and Response Planning

The EWFIU first issued a warning of a possible crop failure in early February 1992. And, at the end of the same month, it was reporting in terms of a drought. FAO then met with the other UN agencies and contacted the MAWRD and the OPM.

Both the GRN and UN agencies involved at this stage reacted with reasonable speed and the local media in Namibia began alerting the population to the drought.

As a result of the early warnings provided, a FAO/WFP crop and food supply assessment mission was mounted in late March 1993. The assessment was carried out with the participation of members from the headquarters of FAO, WFP and UNICEF, local staff from FAO and WFP, and representatives of the MAWRD and the MHSS. This cooperation was seen by the GRN as vital to agreement on the extent of the problems in food crop production, health and nutrition, grazing and livestock conditions, food imports and aid requirements and assistance required for vulnerable groups. The bilateral donor agencies in Namibia did not participate directly in the FAO/WFP assessment, although the independent USAID/OFDA assessment followed this initial assessment by a matter of weeks.

At this stage of the drought operations little conflict was reported among the participants. The GRN was anxious to take the lead in developing the DRP, but the speed at which the emergency became apparent left the relatively inexperienced government somewhat

unprepared. Consequently, the UN agencies rolled into action and the overall feeling is that they were indispensable in getting the relief operation organized.

2. The Appeal Preparation Process

The GRN was charged with the appeal preparation process. Technical support from UNDP, FAO and WFP was again invaluable, especially with regard to informing the GRN of the types of support that would be forthcoming from the potential donors.

The conclusions of the FAO/WFP crop assessment mission were crucial to the drafting of the joint GRN/UN Needs Assessment Report and the subsequent appeal document issued in May 1992. The GRN, whilst in charge of its own appeal, was aware that the ultimate authority in coordinating the appeals of SADC member states was with SADC in cooperation with the UN's DHA. Little use was made of the SADC Liaison Officer during the drought operations period but most GRN officials in retrospect feel that it will be important to maintain this role in the future and hope to make more use of such a person should another pan-regional emergency arise.

At the level of the regional appeal, the GRN reported that it has no complaints as the Namibian appeal was largely accepted as written.

3. Donor Responses and Relief Operations Management

This is the phase of the DRP which was most prone to institutional conflict according to the GRN -- and most of the donor and NGO representatives interviewed. While the general level of cooperation between institutions was reported to be good, misunderstandings did arise regarding the specific responsibilities of participants. The hurried nature of the relief operations, combined with the relative lack of experience in drought relief in Namibian institutions, resulted in the inability of the GRN to comply with some of the regulations of the UN agencies, especially WFP. In particular, the GRN's inability to comply with WFP's monitoring regulations was reportedly marked by a lack of compromise and understanding. So great was the conflict that, even as late as the Harare SADC meeting in September 1993, the GRN and UN agencies still had difficulty in unraveling the problems which arose as a result of the institutional structures in place from those which arose from personality clashes.

a. The Conflict Between WFP and GRN Institutions

Despite the consensus that had apparently been arrived at as a result of the crop assessment mission -- i.e., which recommended a program of special assistance from some 250,000 people in vulnerable groups, comprising children under five years old and pregnant or lactating mothers -- the positions of the GRN and the WFP subsequently widened on this issue and ultimately CCN became entangled in the conflict.

The government's October drought report summarized the divergent positions as follows:

"WFP claims that the GRN decided to widen the food basket to be delivered to vulnerable groups in June/July 1992, so that it would include canned fish, beans and vegetable oil as well as the already agreed to maize meal, beans and maize blend for children. WFP gave its reasons for disagreeing with these additions -- i.e., promotion of dependency and logistical problems -- but the GRN remained adamant that it was in charge of the DRP and saw no reason why it should agree with WFP.

At the same time, the GRN expanded the categories for vulnerable groups, so that school age children, pensioners and disabled persons were included. Again, WFP disagreed and no compromise was reached. These two disagreements were at the root of tense relations between WFP and the GRN during the whole of the DRP and climaxed when the issues were discussed at cabinet level. Some of the GRN officers interviewed claim that WFP had great difficulty in accepting GRN decisions. It is appropriate to note that this level of conflict was not repeated between the GRN and other UN agencies.

As predicted by WFP, the increase in the basket of foods to be delivered under the food aid programme and the increase in beneficiaries, exacerbated logistical, accounting and reporting problems at the regional and local levels. As a result, the conflict between the two institutions continued as the WFP demanded figures on food distributed and to whom as stipulated in their contract with the GRN. The GRN on the other hand could not produce the figures for a myriad of reasons. As well as the larger food basket and the increased numbers of intended beneficiaries, the level of organisation at the regional level was very weak. This is not surprising as the newly independent country had not had the time to establish a form of democratic local government at the DRP's commencement. Indeed, the regional elections which took place in December 1992 may well have exacerbated the problem, as some incumbent Regional Commissioners apparently used food aid for their political advancement. The lack of census data was also a problem in collecting the relevant figures.

What's more the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit of the NDTF, the body responsible for collating and reporting on these figures from the regions, was not fully mobilised until October 1992. A further six months was then required before a system for the monitoring of food flows to the regions was set up.

To further complicate matters, the GRN claims that CCN monitored food at the regional warehouses and therefore had the figures (or at least some of them) which the WFP demanded. CCN may well have had these figures, but claim that it was never their responsibility to collect or release them. Quite possibly

this is a reflection of the diminished role enjoyed by CCN and other NGOs during this drought as compared to that previously where the colonial government's role was minimal and CCN's role quite more prominent. Whatever the reasons, the consequence was that WFP received no reports of regional food distribution until April 1993, nine months after the commencement of food assistance. The recent figures were released by CCN to the government after CCN accepted the responsibility to divulge them, in another memorandum of understanding signed with the government in May 1993.

The implications of this conflict for future institutional frameworks are difficult to assess. On the GRN side, the level of organisation at regional level is likely to be much improved in the future as local government structures are consolidated. The ambiguity regarding the responsibility of CCN to divulge figures will, no doubt, be cleared up in any future memorandums of understanding between the GRN and NGOs. However, the fact remains that a framework should be in place for the resolution of conflict. It is possible that existing mechanisms are sufficient in most circumstances -- no other UN agencies encountered such conflicts either with the GRN or WFP. However, the oft quoted "clash of personalities" which many interviewees interpreted as a cause of conflict should not be ignored. As the old maxim goes: "When institutions are weak, individuals within them become disproportionately important." Conflict resolution should therefore be institutionalised.

Another institutional explanation is that WFP should have been ultimately answerable to the UNDP Resident Representative. Unfortunately for the greater part of the DRP, the UNDP had no Resident Representative, and the acting Resident Representative did not "control" WFP, so that WFP dealt directly with GRN institutions and bilateral during this conflict. This can be at least partially explained by the fact that an acting Resident Representative ratifies a greater number of decisions with headquarters in New York than a fully fledged Resident Representative. A final comment relates to the reporting requirements of WFP. It seems that these can prove too rigorous in an emergency situation, and if WFP insists on the figures, the net result can be the kind of conflict witnessed in Namibia. Citing the better performance of other countries in this regard (Is this true?), and veiled threats regarding the continuation of operations certainly did not result in the bridging of the gap between WFP and the GRN views."

b. The Conflict Between the GRN and the CCN

At the start of the DRP, the GRN was reported by all parties to be determined that the population recognize that the GRN was in control of drought mitigation operations. As this was the first emergency faced by the new government -- and past emergencies had not

witnessed a high colonial government profile in Namibia -- the GRN was aware that a successful DRP would consolidate its leadership position as a government that cared about its people. Beyond that, the GRN was very aware that it was now sovereign and therefore should be in charge of a national emergency.

In this context, it is very difficult to assess the reported conflict between the GRN and CCN. It is not clear whether it was an unfortunate manifestation of the GRN's conflict with the WFP, in which the government simply deflected the pressure it was under from WFP onto the FMLU of CCN or whether CCN deliberately tried to take advantage of the situation to pressure the GRN into increasing CCN's standing with respect to the DRP, based upon its known role during the pre-independence drought of 1990/1991.

In any case, the government claims in its summary report that no diminishment of the role of NGOs was intended by its conflict with CCN, particularly since the NGOs played an important role in the government's assumption of power. The drought emergency was, however, the first time that the GRN and the NGOs had worked together in a post-independence emergency and there was much initial uncertainty regarding the roles of the NGOs. The GRN claims that many of these uncertainties were cleared up in June 1992 when each participating NGO signed a memorandum of understanding with the GRN.

While some of the NGO representatives interviewed by the evaluation team clearly did not agree that all of the problems with the government had been resolved and everyone's role in drought relief was now clear, it appears that the specific conflict with the FMLU of the CCN had to do with a set of poorly stipulated responsibilities in the September 1992 memorandum of understanding negotiated between the GRN and the CCN.

As can best be deciphered from interviewing parties on both sides of the GRN/CCN conflict, the issue in dispute was who was responsible for reporting on the status of food deliveries in order to satisfy WFP's constant demands for information. The GRN claims that the FMLU, as the government's contracted food distributor, was responsible for collecting the necessary data on food deliveries and making them available to all interested parties on a timely basis. The FMLU representative, on the hand, claims that the CCN was never obligated to reveal the distribution figures -- and, in any case, did not have the data for warehouses controlled by the Regional Commissioners.

In any case, the conflict caused a straining of relations between the CCN and the NDTF that lasted for most of the drought relief period. Only in April 1993 were the first accounts released on food distributions in Namibia and a full accounting for the entire period has still not been issued.

C. Commodity Acquisition, Storage and Distribution

1. Commodity Acquisition

All indications are that commercial agents in Namibia handled the procurement and delivery of supplementary stocks of maize for sale very well. The local millers and the Namibian Agronomic Board appear to have coordinated commercial imports in a timely manner based upon the information available in early 1992.

Similarly, the acquisition and delivery of yellow maize from the United States was handled with exceptional efficiency with the first stocks delivered to Namibia within two months of the GRN's appeal for assistance from shipments diverted at sea for the purpose.

Stocks of wheat and other foodstuffs from the several other donors arrived in country later in 1992 and in 1993.

2. Storage

In all of the evaluation team interviews, no representative of the government, donors or NGOs cited serious problems with cereal storage per se around Namibia. A representative of Namib Mills did say that the higher moisture content of yellow maize supplied from the United States caused more minor delays in milling because the maize had to be dried down before it could be properly milled into maize meal.

In general, however, transit times between the ports of entry and the two local mills -- i.e., Agra and Namib Mills -- appear to have been quite satisfactory. After processing, transport of the maize meal to the regional level using Trans Namib and other transport also appears to have been quite good. There were numerous reports, however, of less than efficient operations in moving relief food from the regional level to the actual distribution points.

Overall -- and considering the general state of unpreparedness for drought relief operations in Namibia in early 1992 -- storage of cereals in transit did not seem to cause major problems, nor were significant losses encountered.

3. Distribution

Physical distribution of food during the drought was undertaken through two parallel channels. The great majority of the cereals and other foodstuffs available to Namibians during 1992/1993 were handled through normal commercial channels. Local millers and commercial agents increased their commercial imports of cereals significantly to respond to the early indications of drought. And, in the interviews with the evaluation team, commercial agents said that they could have imported even larger amounts of cereals if they had been encouraged to do so and been guaranteed that concessionary stocks of cereals would not be available in quantities sufficient to disrupt commercial markets.

As far as could be determined in our interviews, no significant problems were encountered in the food distribution through commercial channels.

With respect to distributions through the temporary relief channel, things appear to have gone somewhat less efficiently. Several factors clearly complicated a logistical picture which would have been daunting under even the simplest possible scheme for food relief. Among the complicating factors were:

- The GRN's insistence on broadening the categories for vulnerable groups to include a larger portion of the Namibian population -- i.e., all children from birth through primary school age, all pregnant and lactating women, all pensioners, all handicapped persons, etc. -- and basing the selection of vulnerable groups on individual, rather than household, characteristics;
- The GRN's stipulation of different food relief packages -- up to 21 different packages by one count -- for different vulnerable groups, with individual packages stipulated to contain up to eight different commodities;
- Poor processes for registering people as eligible for food aid which were open to manipulation by local officials in the middle of the regional election campaign;
- Failure to organize a single integrated transportation operation, supported by a consolidated emergency budget, to facilitate the movement of relief foodstuffs around the country.

D. Monitoring

The monitoring and evaluation of drought relief operations was to have been coordinated by a special unit within the NDTF, with the assistance of researchers from NISER and specialists from the EWFIU.

Most persons interviewed by the evaluation team agreed that the monitoring and evaluation of the DRP had been generally deficient over most of the period of actual relief operations. The first monitoring and evaluation report was only produced in late 1992. The first data on the actual distribution of relief food did not appear until 16 months after the onset of the drought.

The GRN has yet to produce a complete accounting of the actual costs of the DRP even though it has issued what is its summary report on the DRP. Without such a financial report, it is impossible for anyone to do any analysis of the cost effectiveness of the various interventions under the DRP. And, finally, the final NISER report on the effects of the drought on the socio-economic status of the rural households survey during 1993 had not yet been issued by the time the evaluation team departed Windhoek in late October.

Having interviewed the principal researcher in charge of the socio-economic survey report, the evaluation team has great hope that the issuance of the final NISER report will provide a good empirical basis for understanding what actually happened to a broad sample of rural households as a result of the drought. It is unfortunate, therefore, that data from the third round of the survey and final analysis of the entire data set were not available for inclusion in this report.

IV. RESULTS

A. Timeliness

Considering that the GRN had no collective experience with national disaster management prior to the onset of drought conditions in January 1992 and, hence, had no specific institutional structures in place to organize and manage the government's response, the overall response to the 1992/1993 drought was at least creditable and reasonably timely. The organizational problems encountered early and mid-1992 were in setting up a mechanism within government to do a proper needs assessment as the basis for a drought assistance appeal and, then, in negotiating the appropriate roles and responsibilities of government agencies, NGOs, multilateral and bilateral donor agencies in support of the DRP.

To the extent that there were initial delays in mounting a GRN/NGO/donor response to the drought, it should be recognized that they were mitigated to a large degree by the excellent response of the private sector in ensuring adequate cereal stocks in local stores throughout the drought period.

Two other factors also mitigated against serious consequences from the initial delays, they were:

- The fact that Namibia, unlike some of its SADC neighbors, was not suffering from anything like the "worst drought in living memory" but, in reality, was experiencing a drought of somewhat moderate proportions, even when compared to Namibia's last major drought in the early 1980s; and
- Namibia is, for the most part, a very arid country even in times of "normal" rainfall and the local population, as distinguished from the government, can hardly be said to be unacquainted with drought conditions. This being the case, while some people in the rural areas were slow to react to the onset of drought conditions, many others reacted quickly and well to the changing conditions and survived the drought without any significant assistance from the government.

B. Impact

1. Beneficiaries

As the GRN has not presented its final accounting of administration and costs of the DRP and the final NISER report on the socio-economic status of rural households is not yet available, it is very difficult to make any definitive statements on the beneficiary populations aided by the DRP -- particularly with respect to distribution of free food.

The original drought relief appeal issued by the GRN estimated that 625,000 Namibians would be affected by the drought and that 250,000 of these persons were eligible to be classified in the GRN's designated vulnerable groups to receive free relief food packages.

The final list of vulnerable groups included: children under five years of age; students between five and 12 years of age; pregnant and/or lactating women; the elderly -- i.e., pensioners; and the physically and mentally handicapped. This classification, because it enumerated individuals by broad criteria not closely related to drought-induced need -- gave considerable latitude to local officials to include large number of people whose economic status was not necessarily different that it had been before the onset of the drought. As such, the vulnerable groups system erred on the side of over-inclusiveness in terms of candidate registration in many areas.

The figures presented in the GRN's summary drought report issued in October 1993 are vague as to the actual numbers of persons provided with free food under the DRP. The most comprehensive statement in that report is presented below:

"On the average, and prior to October 1992, food was distributed to 176,000 beneficiaries per month.

However, the number of people assisted had risen to 220,000 per month by October 1992 and was expected to remain at the same level until May 1993. A total of 51,575 beneficiaries in 5 regions (a reduced number) Oshana, Hardap, Karas, Kunene and Omaheke received food during the last half December 1992 and the first half January 1993.

It is worth mentioning that a shortage of some commodities to meet the demand, like beans and cooking oil, was experienced.

One of the main problems faced by the drought committee members at regional and local level that resulted in over-registration, was the identification or rather distinction between vulnerable groups affected by drought and families suffering from chronic poverty."

Beyond the free food program for vulnerable groups, it was estimated by the FFW Unit of the NDTF that more than 6,000 able-bodied persons were involved in FFW projects at the height of the drought emergency, with around 325 metric tons of food being distributed each month. Over Rand 2,000,000 was committed to the supply of food for FFW projects and another Rand 400,000 was contributed by UNICEF for the provision of non-food items.

As to the beneficiaries from the various agricultural relief programs, it is reported that a total of 15,656 cows and oxen were sold to MeatCo under the GRN's subsidized marketing scheme between March 1992 and January 1993 from the northern communal areas. In addition, 12,274 cows and oxen and 48,226 small ruminants qualified for the government subsidy at auctions (including permit days) from April 1992 to January 1993 in the southern areas of Namibia. As all figures for this program are cited as livestock numbers, there is no indication of how many livestock owners actually benefitted from the subsidies offered.

The MAWRD reports that "a total of 621 commercial farmers (14.8 percent of the total commercial farmers) and 15,870 communal farmers benefitted from the fodder and licks program for livestock." However, since a large number of communal households do not own livestock, it is difficult to express the number of participants in communal areas as a percentage of total households. Further to livestock interventions, it is reported that Rand 2,160,000 was spent on the subsidy program for karakul pelts but the exact number of farmers benefitting from this program is unknown.

Finally, although there are figures for total crop inputs distributed and subsidies provided for ploughing and planting support in 1993, no precise information on the actual number of beneficiary households was available during the evaluation team's mission.

With respect to the emergency water supply program, the Department of Water Affairs of the MAWRD states that: "In all, some 350,000 people have benefitted from the accelerated water supply programme under the national drought relief programme."

The GRN's summary report on the drought contains no figures on the number of Namibians who received assistance from the special health/nutrition interventions undertaken in the context of the DRP. This is, however, an indication that the immunization coverage for measles reached 74 percent of the population at risk by the end of 1992.

2. Institutions

a. Capacities

There is a general consensus that the GRN, donors and NGOs learned a great deal about each other's capacities between the drought emergency. And, even with all of the organizational and institutional problems that interviewees discussed with the evaluation team, the active collaboration of government officials, donor representatives, and NGO staff and volunteers had on balance a positive outcome.

While future plans for installing a permanent disaster management capacity in Namibia are not yet finalized, the GRN reports the following steps are under active consideration for the immediate post-drought period:

"With the proposed reduction in the scope and scale of drought relief operations, the Cabinet Committee on Drought and the NDTF would be adjourned indefinitely. A National Drought Committee (NDC) with a reduced membership could take over the residual functions of the NDTF. The proposed Disaster Management Authority, the establishment of which is under review, is expected to provide an institutional home for the NDC. Until the review is complete, present NDTF arrangements will remain in place.

Regional Drought Committees would be adjourned indefinitely where drought relief operations are to be suspended. Where these operations are to continue, but on a reduced scale, regional drought committees, constituency and/or local committees would be retained and would operate as before.

The UN agencies, principally UNICEF, WFP and FAO, under the auspices of the UNDP Resident Representative, would be invited to maintain their current interest by supporting the National Drought Committee and helping to establish the proposed Disaster Management Agency in the Office of the Prime Minister.

The responsibility for coordinating the transport and storage of DRP food commodities down to the regional level and for issuing food to the constituency/ sub-store level, record-keeping, etc. would continue to be vested in the CCN/FMLU.

The role of NGOs at regional level will be to cooperate with the regional drought committees in the distribution of relief food to the drought-affected community. This should be done within the framework of the NDTF Plan of Operations for the Drought Emergency (May 1993).

Cooperation with the regional drought committees may include:

- identification of beneficiaries;
- transport, storage and handling of relief supplies;
- scheduling and planning of distributions;
- monitoring distribution of relief supplies;
- development and monitoring of FFW projects; and

-- training of local and GRN staff in the above activities.

Cooperating NGOs may also become involved in the livestock (e.g., emergency de-stocking, fodder distribution), water programmes (e.g., borehole and pump maintenance) and post-drought recovery (e.g., distribution of seeds and tools, accelerated re-stocking)."

b. Policies

There is some evidence that GRN policies are changing in, at least, the three major areas:

- Formulation of water resource policy is now consolidated under the Department of Water Affairs and it appears that all future water interventions will take place within the context of a national water resource management plan being drawn up with technical assistance funded by GTZ. Moreover, serious consideration is now being given to installation of a fee system for water users in rural areas to encourage conservation of existing water resources and provide funds for decentralized maintenance of water delivery systems.
- There appears to be some greater urgency behind government efforts to formulate resource management plans for all areas of the country, but particularly for the communal areas in the north. In this regard, it is likely that previous policies for the installation of boreholes with motorized lift capacities will be reevaluated to limit their capacities to support excess numbers of livestock on depleted rangelands and draw down the existing water tables.
- There appears to be a greater possibility for installation of environmental assessment requirements for a whole range of development projects and activities in Namibia as a result of growing drought-induced doubts about the sustainability of many current development activities.

c. Planning

The evaluation team believes that the GRN, donors and NGOs, by virtual of their cooperative efforts in 1992/1993, have laid the basis for more effective disaster relief planning in the future. The GRN has been quite frank in its reporting on the 1992/1993 drought. It has admitted that mistakes were made in the planning and implementation of the DRP and, from all indications, has learned a number of valuable lessons to be applied to the next emergency.

While GRN officials are still wrestling with the precise institutional form for a permanent disaster management unit within government, there seems to be no doubt among senior decision-makers that some permanent capacity is needed to enable Namibia to better cope with a broad range of possible emergencies in the future.

3. Sectors

a. Agriculture

It is literally impossible at present to determine empirically what actually happened to farm households in communal areas of Namibia during the 1992/1993 drought. As EWFIS officials stated in the GRN's summary drought report: "The available agricultural data base remains weak, particularly with regard to the smallholder and subsistence sector, for which little or no information is available. Statistical and agro-meteorological methods and procedures for crop/yield forecasting are still in a very rudimentary stage." They went on to state that "data on the existing production, marketing, prices and stocks from the small-scale, non-commercial sector in the three northern regions are virtually non-existent."

This being the case, essentially all of the empirical data on production agriculture in Namibia comes from the large-scale, commercial farming sector as collected by the parastatal Agronomic Board. In addition, crop data are available from the Namibia Agricultural Union (NAU), which is an umbrella organization of 103 commercial Farmers Associations for areas where the associations are active. Finally, the First National Development Corporation (FNDC), a parastatal involved in development projects in a number of sectors, collects and provides information on areas planted and expected production within their 500 hectare irrigation scheme in Kavango.

Unfortunately for purposes of this report, then, the most accurate agricultural sector data are available for precisely that portion of the farming community which was most able and prepared to take care of itself during the drought -- i.e., the commercial farmers on large ranches below the quarantine "red line" fence. And, from all indications, these farmers made it through 1992/1993 in reasonably good shape with very little assistance from the government or the donors.

With respect to the MAWRD itself, perhaps the most constructive changes arising from the drought experience has been the consolidation of all water-related activities with the Department of Water Affairs. This move is aimed at providing the country with a national water resources plan and an integrated approach to water management in both urban and rural areas.

A second change is the strengthening of the EWFU with additional personnel and resources during the drought and its anticipated integration into a permanent institutional mechanism for disaster preparedness after the drought. The EWFU in the MAWRD is now producing regular reports on the food security situation in Namibia and this reporting will be strengthened further as the Unit expands its crop sampling program in the future.

b. Transport

There were a number of comments from interviewees about the difficulties encountered by NGOs in trying to move relief food around Namibia in 1992/1993 through parallel, non-commercial distribution channels. Many of these problems relate to the simple fact that Namibia is a very large country with a small population which is often sparsely distributed. Only in the extreme north of the country are population densities high enough to really facilitate distribution of free relief food.

It is difficult to determine from interviews and the existing reports whether there have been a major changes in the transport sector as a result of the drought. The GRN reports that every region of the country now has at least one truck and a light all-terrain vehicle for food delivery and supervision. The FMLU of the CCN also said that it had built up of motorpool of over thirty vehicles, mostly as a result of external donations, which it intended to retain for project and emergency assistance work in the future. Finally, other NGOs said that they too had received contributions of vehicles for drought relief and rehabilitation work.

Perhaps the most significant lesson learned by the GRN for future disaster work is that any national relief program will need to be supported by establishment of a consolidated government transportation fund. This fund, if properly administered, would presumably remedy some of the inter-ministerial wrangling that went on under the DRP over who would supply transport for specific field operations.

In Namibia, unlike other member states of the SADC, there were no major donor-supported infrastructural changes to what is already an outstanding national transport network.

C. Drought's Effect on Country's Vulnerability

1. Economy

It is doubtful whether the 1992/1993 drought will have any long-term effects that will increase the country's economic vulnerability. To the contrary, valuable experience has been gained by the GRN, local NGOs and the donor community which should benefit Namibia when emergencies occur in the future. Moreover, many positive steps have been taken by the government to increase its capacity to manage such situations. Among the positive achievements are:

- The development of a more effective EWFIS in the MAWRD;
- The decision to install a modest but permanent disaster management unit within government under the OPM;
- The decision to unify the planning and management of national water resources within a reorganized Department of Water Affairs in the MAWRD;

- The clarification of appropriate roles and responsibilities between the government and local NGOs in the management of disaster relief activities; and
- The emergence of an effective instrument at NISER for the collection, analysis and reporting of empirical data on the characteristics of household vulnerability in different regions of the country.

2. Household Level

The only empirical household level data on the impacts of the 1992/1993 drought in Namibia were collected by researchers at NISER. These data, collected during three rounds of interviewing with approximately 1,000 Namibian households, have been analyzed at the Institute but the final report has not yet been issued. The evaluation team requested that the final report when available to sent to the United States for their use but, unfortunately, it did not arrive before this report was drafted.

V. SPECIAL ISSUES

A. Effects of the Drought on the Country's Development

It appears unlikely that the 1992/1993 drought will have any persistent negative effects on Namibia's long-term economic development. The government has already declared the 1992/1993 drought over and early rains in October 1993 have given hope of more "normal" conditions for the 1993/1994 crop season. And, in any case, the primary growth points projected for the domestic economy -- i.e., mining, fisheries, etc. -- are not likely to be strongly affected by localized drought conditions in the country.

One positive outcome of the drought is that livestock grazing pressures on over-exploited rangelands has been reduced to some degree through forced sales and outright mortality. In the medium-term, at least, this provides a somewhat more sustainable production environment at least in the period before restocking is complete.

B. Relationship Between the Drought and the USAID Program

USAID activities with respect to the 1992/1993 drought in Namibia were viewed by the Mission staff as "exceptional" management events. While it is evident that management of drought activities in the last year required exceptional efforts from the very small USAID Mission staff in Windhoek, there were no indications that the "exceptional" activities in drought management undertaken in the last year will have significant consequences for or long-term impacts upon the USAID Mission's country strategy or development program. The programming for the primary USAID vehicle for affecting resource management issues in Namibia -- i.e., the Living in a Finite Environment (LIFE) Project -- was already in place before the drought struck and the major orientation of the overall program, according to

Mission documents, will continue to be on formal basic education and non-formal adult education for the next five years.

If there are to be changes in USAID activities in Namibia oriented toward mitigating the effects of drought of the local economy, they are most likely to emerge as further "drought-proofing" agricultural research activities with ICRISAT under the on-going contractual program through SARP.

C. Relationship with World Bank Structural Adjustment Program

Namibia, as a lower middle income country, is not eligible for International Development Association (IDA) loans from the World Bank and has elected not to accept standard World Bank loans. There is, therefore, no World Bank structural adjustment program in Namibia.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

A. Food Distribution

- The consensus among people interviewed by the evaluation team was that, given a choice between donor importation of commodities for distribution or receipt of financial contributions from the donors to directly increase the purchasing power of targeted "vulnerable" groups through domestic commercial markets -- government receipt of financial grants would have been the preferred alternative. This alternative was seen as potentially less disruptive of existing commercial systems and more capable of supplying "vulnerable" Namibian consumers with a wider range of commodities more in line with their own preferences.
- There was virtually unanimous consensus among donor and NGO representatives that the system for classifying "vulnerable" groups in Namibia was much too complicated and inappropriate to the social context. This is so because Namibian households, as elsewhere in Africa, share available food among all members and do not usually prepare different diets for individual family members based upon age, sex or other criteria. Definition and distribution of different drought relief packages for different "vulnerable" groups was viewed as elegant in theory but unworkable in fact. The system was unworkable for three main reasons: (i.) there were too many individual commodities in the food packages specified for vulnerable groups; (ii.) organizations charged with the actual food distribution rarely had stocks of all of the commodities specified for the group packages on hand at the same time to pre-assemble packages; and (iii.) actual delivery of even partial packages to only the defined "vulnerable" recipients proved extremely difficult under field conditions.

- Attempts to organize and implement FFW activities in Namibia under 1990/1991 and 1992/1993 drought conditions were generally acknowledged to have been failures -- the only possible exception being activities mounted by OXFAM Canada. In fact, based upon the 1990/1991 experiences with FFW activities, many participants said they had recommended that a FFW program not be included in the 1992/1993 DRP.

In the opinion of the evaluation team, their recommendations should have been taken seriously because, in fact, only a very small percentage of the able-bodied population deemed at risk and eligible for food aid actually participated in FFW activities and the projects themselves were, in many cases, judged to have been ill-conceived, hastily designed, poorly executed, unsustainable, and of high cost per participant served.

- Donors on occasion supplied commodities deemed inappropriate or in direct competition with products produced in Namibia and available through commercial outlets. These included contributions of tinned and dried fish, cooking oil and beans, as well as the surplus commodities contributed by the United States from leftover Gulf War stocks.

B. Water and Resource Management

- In the Namibian context, as elsewhere in Africa, water must be seen as an input into a resource management system and not as an objective in and of itself. In the absence of established, community-based resource management systems, indiscriminate development of water sources is highly likely to have adverse economic and environmental consequences for both local communities and the country as a whole.
- Development of water resources should not be undertaken primarily to accomplish short-term political objectives, but only in the context of long-term, well-articulated development programs.
- Careful development of local water resources for human consumption in highly targeted locations can be an appropriate component in a drought mitigation program. Conversely, however, the periodic absence of water supplies in areas that are clearly vulnerable to overgrazing and resource destruction by livestock should be seen as an opportunity to force reductions in grazing pressures. In a drought situation, the principal cause of livestock mortality is the insufficient forage resource, not the absence of water per se.

The evaluation team members unfortunately have personally witnessed too many incidents in Africa where livestock -- and, particularly, cattle -- have died of starvation during droughts while literally standing in or next to abundant supplies of water. Moreover, we are not convinced from our interviews that there are any large areas of Namibia that cannot be utilized by livestock, at least on a seasonal basis, due solely to the absence of permanent waterpoints.

- During the period of the drought, government concentrated primarily on drilling of new boreholes and rehabilitation of existing boreholes. While some NGO programs tested alternative water development systems -- i.e., capped springboxes, "jetted" shallow wells, and hand pumps -- in some areas, overall there was a noticeable lack of creativity in approaching water development problems. In this regard, American government support for installation of additional boreholes during the drought unfortunately reinforced the Namibian government's own emphasis on borehole development as the primary means of supplying water to both the human and livestock populations.

As a result of experience gained during the drought and with the reorganization of the Department of Water Affairs, the government now appears to be more willing to reassess its whole approach to water development in rural areas. If the American government wishes to involve itself in the evolution of a new water resources program in Namibia, a clear distinction must be made between development of potable water supplies for the human population and development of additional water resources as an input into improved livestock management systems.

C. Institutional

- The government appears to have learned a great deal from their first emergency experience. Government institutions are in the process of being reorganized to better service the needs of the client groups in the communal areas and to react to specific technical problems which surfaced during the drought period. The drought relief effort forced greater inter-ministerial coordination within the government than had existed before and all evidence leads us to believe that this coordination will continue. This might be the most significant and beneficial consequence of the entire drought effort in Namibia.
- There appears to be a consensus among the interviewees that the formal government/donor/NGO coordination mechanism used did not facilitate sufficiently frequent or frank discussions of the major drought relief issues. In addition, several respondents indicated that, when meetings were held with the government, some of the participating donor representatives tended to be too passive and uncritical in responding to government presentations, while others were overly aggressive in pushing individual agendas.
- Although useful informal contacts and discussions occurred between major donors and between individual donors and NGOs, the donor/NGO community as a whole never organized a formal forum independent of the government to discuss issues, arrive at common positions on those issues, and facilitate coordination between individual relief programs. Had this forum existed, some of the tensions which arose between implementors during the drought relief effort might have been negotiated before they

were tabled in the larger government/ donor/NGO meetings and written up in SADC reports.

- There appears to have been a failure in government/donor/NGO discussions to arrive at a clear working distinction between activities appropriate in the context of an emergency drought relief effort and those activities with longer-term development objectives that would be better implemented with "programmed" food aid. This deficiency is particularly true in the case of FFW activities, but is also evident with respect to water development schemes.
- Regional Committees were given responsibilities for distribution of drought relief commodities but were not provided with financial resources to implement these distributions in a timely manner. In the future, devolution of DRP responsibilities to regional and local authorities must be accompanied with appropriate and timely financial transfers.
- If relief efforts are properly planned and implemented to address specific and short-term vulnerabilities caused by exceptional drought conditions, they are highly likely to be self-terminating and should not engender long-term dependencies among local constituencies. The greatest danger for creating dependencies exists when the government confuses short-term drought relief activities with longer-term development objectives and then seeks to capitalize upon the temporary emergency situation to further its development objectives.
- In drought needs assessments and subsequent relief program implementation, government and donor officials must pay greater attention to the porous nature of the Namibia/Angola border and the fact that food commodities and livestock regularly flow across the frontier in both directions in response to changes in annual rainfall patterns and differential economic conditions. These exchanges are facilitated by the presence of the same ethnic groups on both sides of the frontier.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Food Aid Issues

- Work with the MAWRD's Directorate of Agricultural Planning, the Agronomic Board, representatives of local milling companies, the EWFIU, and other donor representatives to establish before the next drought clear and commonly agreed criteria for defining Namibia's structural food deficit.
- Having established the bounds of Namibia's structural food deficit, make it clear to senior GRN officials that requests for drought emergency commodities will only be considered if evidence is presented simultaneously that Namibia has already made commitments to fully satisfy its structure deficit through normal commercial channels.
- Consider using financial grants for any future DRP in Namibia to directly supplement the purchasing power of vulnerable households in domestic markets, rather than importing cereals directly.
- Offer technical assistance to the GRN to design and evaluate alternative systems for converting financial grants to the GRN into increased purchasing power for vulnerable households -- i.e., through the pension scheme, ration cards, food chits, etc..
- Encourage the GRN to redefine its criteria for assessing vulnerability in drought situations. Concentrate on defining vulnerable households within communities, rather than vulnerable individuals within households.
- Encourage the GRN to supply standard ration packages of free food to vulnerable households containing a maximum of four commodities.
- Avoid any involvement in local FFW programs unless the United States determines it has an interest in developing a long-term programmed food aid activity in Namibia. Hastily-conceived, short-term FFW programs in Namibia clearly have not provided a viable alternative to free food distribution for vulnerable groups, nor have they been a cost-effective way of using donor and GRN resources.
- In the absence of a demonstrated need for specific items, refrain from importing food commodities into Namibia simply because they happen to be available to American agencies on concessionary terms.
- Consider developing a mechanism to monetize any future cereals contributions to Namibia either within the country -- or, preferably, within the South Africa Customs Union -- and use the financial proceeds to support a program to increase the household purchasing power for specifically targeted vulnerable households.

- If United States food contributions are channeled through the WFP in the future, that organization must be encouraged to develop country-specific drought relief assistance programs in southern Africa which clearly and explicitly recognize the differences between the SADC countries -- i.e., different degrees of food security, roles for the private sector, articulations of food delivery systems, and the macroeconomic positions.

B. Water and Resource Use Issues

- Do not involve American agencies in the development of any new water points or water conveyance systems unless the water is delivered as input for sound community-based or commercial resource management systems.
- In the absence of sound area grazing schemes for livestock, any American involvement in rehabilitation of existing waterpoints should be strictly limited to developing improved potable water systems for the human population. Such systems should have appropriate mechanisms to restrict daily water flows to the requirements of the human population and ensure water quality.
- Consider technical assistance to the government or local NGOs to introduce and test alternative water capture, storage and use mechanisms -- i.e., capped springboxes, small catchment dams, percolation washes, hand pumps for shallow aquifers, etc..
- Require independent environmental impact assessments for all American-funded water development activities in Namibia.

C. Institutional Issues

- In the event of another major emergency requiring donor assistance, encourage the organization of a formal donor/multilateral agency/NGO forum to facilitate frank and open discussions between participants, negotiate disagreements, and coordinate activities between implementing agencies.
- Continue proactive efforts to supply farmers with improved, drought tolerant crop varieties appropriate to Namibian conditions and information on how to use these new seeds and plant materials effectively.
- Encourage the GRN to clearly distinguish in any emergency preparedness system between short-term activities appropriate to mitigating the emergency conditions and longer-term development activities.

ANNEX A

PERSONS CONTACTED BY THE EVALUATION TEAM

A. United States Government Agencies

Marshall McCallie	Ambassador, American Embassy (Tel: 221601)
Katherine Peterson 221601)	Deputy Chief of Mission, American Embassy (Tel:
Richard Shortlidge	USAID Representative (Tel: 225935)
Bessy Kong	Director, Peace Corps (Tel: 226525)
Mark Johnson	Program Officer, USAID (Tel: 225935)
Johannes Gaomab	Program Assistant, USAID (Tel: 225935)

B. International and Bilateral Donor Agencies

Antony Mornement	Director of Operations, World Food Programme (Tel: 229220)
Hiroyuki Matsumura	World Food Programme (Tel: 2002360)
Nancy Terreri	Country Representative, UNICEF (Tel: 229220)
Stephen Adkisson	Programme Officer, UNICEF (Tel: 229220)
Steven Rogers	UNICEF and ex-Peace Corps Volunteer (Tel: 229220)
Scott Poe	UNICEF and ex-Peace Corps Volunteer (Tel: 229220)
Dawit Giorgis	UNDP Senior Advisor to the National Drought Task Force, Office of the Prime Minister (Tel: 222644)
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Jochen Kenneweg	Coordinator of German Assistance, Embassy of Germany (Tel: 229217)
Dr. Jorn C. Fitter	GTZ Representative, Directorate of Planning, Pricing, Marketing and Cooperatives, Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development (Tel: 224550)
Jan de Kok	Counsellor, Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities in Namibia (Tel: 220099)
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Sven Bjerregaard	Charge d'Affaires, Embassy of Denmark (Tel:229956)
Arild R. Øyen	Counsellor and Coordinator/NORAD, Embassy of Norway (Tel: 227812)
Eddie Taylor	Second Secretary and Coordinator/ODA, British High Commission (Tel: 223022)
Juhani Toivonen	Counsellor for Development Corporation, Embassy of Finland (Tel: 221355)

C. Government of Namibia

Immanuel W. Dumeni	Under-Secretary, Cabinet Office, Office of the Prime Minister and former Head of the National Drought Task Force (Tel: 2872017)
Benedictus Rukamba	Head of Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, National Drought Task Force Tel: 222644)
Nama Gaoabab	Permanent Secretary, National Planning Commission (Tel: 222549)
Bernadette Artivor	Director of Multi and Bilateral Development Cooperation, National Planning Commission (Tel: 222549)
Christoph Schumann	Head of Bilateral Development Cooperation, National Planning Commission (Tel: 222549)
Callie Sclottwein	Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development (Tel: 3029111)
Richard Fry	Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development (Tel: 3963085)
Martin Harris	Acting Chief/Planning, Department of Water Affairs, Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development (Tel: 3963085)
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Johannes "Mick" de Jager	Ministry of Wildlife, Conservation and Tourism (Tel: 2849111)
Dr. Steven Devereux	Economist, National Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of Namibia (Tel: 42421)
Paul van der Merve	Noydome Agricultural College (Tel: 062640486)

D. Non-Governmental Agencies

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Michael Nuboer	Food Management and Logistics Unit, National Drought Task Force and Council of Churches of Namibia/Lutheran World Federation (Tel: 224281)
David Godfrey	Executive Director, The Rossing Foundation (Tel: 211721)
Carolyn N. Hughes	Country Representative, Africare (Tel: 221807)
Brian Carney	Project Officer/Water Project, International Medical Corps (Tel: 222358)

Wendy Smith Development Delegate, International Red Cross (Tel: 222135)
Phil Robinson Project Director, Co-operation for Development (Tel: 240036)

E. Private Sector Firms, Project Staff and Other Organizations

James H. Baird Consultant to Peace Corps
Dr. Chris Weaver Team Leader, LIFE Project, USAID
Barbara Wyckoff-Baird LIFE Project, USAID
Charles McBeth Peace Corps Volunteer/Civil Engineer, Department of Water Affairs, Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development (Tel: 3963085)

Christo Van Niekerk Owner of Oehlland Cattle and Game Ranch and House of Southern Estates (Tel: 229881)

Dawid Erasmus Grand Canyon Spur Steak Ranches (Tel: 231003)
Frans Meyer General Manager for Finance and Operation, Namib Mills (Pty) Limited (Tel: 217001)

Dr. Charles H. Hocutt Center for Environmental and Estuarine Studies, University of Maryland

Linet Arthur Food Studies Group, Oxford University, Oxford, England
Kaj Zacho Hansen FAO Consultant and Economist, Namibia Early Warning and Food Information System, Directorate of Planning, Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development (Tel: 222974)

Dr. Mary Seeley Environmental Evaluation Associates of Namibia (Pty) Ltd. and Desert Ecology Research Unit of Namibia (Tel: 64527/33171)

ANNEX B

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ANNEX C

LISTING OF EACH RECIPIENT OF UNITED STATES FUNDING

United States government drought relief to Namibia in 1992/1993 amounted to \$ 10,900,000.

In February 1992, the United States Department of Defense donated 3,000 tons of food rations left over from the United Nations sanctioned United States-led military offensive to free Kuwait. Although the donation, worth \$ 6,500,000, was arranged prior to the drought, the food was used to provide relief during the early stages of the emergency.

The core of the United States emergency response to the relief effort was a donation of 10,000 metric tons of maize costing \$ 2,580,000. This maize was channelled through the World Food Program (WFP) to support Namibia's vulnerable group feeding program.

In addition, OFDA provided UNICEF with \$ 700,000 for non-food immunization and health/nutrition projects in Namibia under a Southern Africa Regional assistance package. AID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) donated \$ 51,350 to the Namibian Red Cross via the International Confederation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies for provision of vitamin A and food distribution.

OFDA also channelled \$ 709,571 through the International Medical Corps (IMC) for the rehabilitation as well as drilling of 40 boreholes in the Erongo and Kunene regions in collaboration with the Department of Water Affairs.

A total of \$ 64,485 was allocated from the American Ambassador's Self-Help Fund to the Department of Water Affairs of the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development (MAWRD) to install water storage cisterns in various regions. OFDA allocated an additional \$ 25,000 to procure six truck-mountable water bladders for use in water distribution to rural sites.

The AID Southern Africa Regional Program (SARP) spent \$ 67,200 to procure 60 metric tons of Okashana I millet seed from Zambia for distribution to farmers through the Mahanene Research Station of the MAWRD. This procurement was facilitated under the SADCC/ICRISAT Sorghum and Millet Improvement Program, funded by AID through a SARP grant.

The United States Peace Corps in Namibia undertook a special drought relief initiative to provide assistance in water supply and management activities as well as in food distribution at the community and national levels. The initiative was funded by AID/OFDA with a budget of \$ 152,000 under which the services of 10 third-year Peace Corps Volunteers were provided to Namibia's drought relief program for ten to 12 months of service.

The drought relief Peace Corps Volunteers began arriving in Namibia in early October 1992 and after a brief orientation went to their posts. All of the initial eight Volunteers were in place by November 1992 and the final two reached their post in January 1993. Six Volunteers were assigned to the MAWRD's Department of Water Affairs as hydro-geologists.

Provision of these Volunteers enabled the Department of Water Affairs to fully staff the regional offices of its 14 Emergency Water Supply Units (EWSU). One of the Volunteers was assigned to Department of Water Affairs headquarters in Windhoek to assist in managing the EWSU program as a whole. The five water supply Volunteers were posted in the Caprivi, Omusati, Ohangwena, Oshana, Oshikoto and Omaheke regions.

As each region has particular water supply and management needs, the water Volunteers worked in a variety of areas such as the provision of technical assistance in determining drilling sites and installing boreholes, designing and installing community wells, conducting rural water supply needs assessments, assisting water extension activities, and installing or repairing water pipelines and pumps.

The two Volunteers working in the Omusati, Ohangwena, Oshana and Oshikoto regions conducted a survey of the over 300 boreholes in those regions in order to precisely locate them, determine whether the boreholes were functional and if not, what type of rehabilitation service they would require, determine the equipment that was available on site, and determine basic data about each borehole -- i.e., storage capacity, headworks, depth, number of users, etc..

The water Volunteers also set up a system of maintaining and updating information on a longer term basis. As a result, the Volunteers developed a computer database system to store and process borehole and groundwater data into various reporting forms. The system was also designed to facilitate additional modifications and processing of data in a standardized format. To facilitate information on accurate borehole location, the Volunteers wrote their own software package for use in mapping borehole coordinates used QBasic software. They also designed computerized survey and field report forms for standardized usage.

Two drought relief Volunteers were assigned to the Food Management Logistics Unit headquarters in Windhoek to work as food distribution trainers to facilitate the training of regional food warehouse staff in management, computers, record keeping, logistics and administration. The two Volunteers were also involved in drafting national guidelines for the Food for Work program as well as in implementing national training programs for regional Food for Work facilitators. The two other Volunteers working in the drought relief program were assigned to the Directorate of Rural Development of the MAWRD as facilitators for Food for Work activities in the regions.

The Volunteer working as the Food for Work facilitator in the Omusati, Ohangwena, Oshana and Oshikoto regions designed Food for Work information packets and training programs which are region-specific and have been translated into the local language and, as a result,

have stimulated interest in the program to such an extent that 560 new project proposals have been submitted from the Ombalantu area alone.

All of the Volunteers who served in the drought relief program were experienced field personnel who transferred to Namibia after two or more years of successful service in other Peace Corps programs in Chad, Senegal, Guinea, Lesotho, Cape Verde, Jamaica and the Solomon Islands. They had diverse backgrounds in technical education and skills which included Ph.D., M.S. and B.S. degrees in civil engineering, environmental engineering and related fields. All six Volunteers assigned to the Department of Water Affairs as hydro-geologists had worked on rural water supply programs during their first two years of Peace Corps service and many were licensed engineers in the United States with water supply related work before signing up with the Peace Corps. The two Volunteers involved in food distribution logistics at the Food Management Logistics Unit were community extension officers prior to their Peace Corps tour and had extensive experience in designing and facilitating community based training programs for adults.

ANNEX D

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS

<u>DATE</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
June 1991	UNDP funds and FAO assists in implementing an Early Warning and Food Information System for Namibia.
October 1991	1991/1992 rainy season starts early and well.
January 1992	Rains fail in many areas of Namibia after a "normal" rainy season through December 1991.
February 1992	A total of 3,000 metric tons of United States Defense Department food rations from the Gulf War worth \$ 6,500,000 arrive in Namibia.
April 1992	The Government of Namibia, through a special Cabinet Committee on Drought and with technical support from the United Nations sets in motion contingency measures and draws up the national Drought Relief Program (DRP)
April 1992	AID/OFDA Southern Africa Drought Assessment conducted from 24 March to 29 April 1992.
May 1992	National Drought Relief Program is launched by the President of Namibia, His Excellency Dr. Sam Nujoma. Initial projections of government expenditures for drought relief was Rand 171 million (\$ 59,454,000).
May 1992	The National Drought Task Force (NDTF) is constituted and charged with the responsibility to run the relief operation.
June 1992	Water volume in the country's major surface catchment dams stands at only 26 percent of full capacity, compared with 42.2 percent in June 1991. Emergency Groundwater Supply Unit (EGSU) is created under Deputy Permanent Secretary Richard Fry of the MAWRD. The largest ever borehole drilling program is started with issuance of ten drilling contracts and five rehabilitation contracts, to run concurrently. In addition, borehole drilling is started by the Department itself and by the International Medical Corps, with the eventual assistance of drought relief Peace Corps Volunteers.

July 1992	The first 842 metric tons of food is distributed to 67,400 beneficiaries.
August 1992	All by 9,000 metric tons of national cereal import needs of 116,400 metric tons are met by food aid pledges and commercial imports. Local millers have brought 73,200 metric tons of wheat and maize into the country.
August 1992	By the end of the month, a total of Rand 3 million is paid out to beneficiaries of the national livestock scheme.
September 1992	Agreement between the GRN and the Council of Churches of Namibia is signed to establish the Food Management and Logistics Unit to cooperate in the management of the transportation, handling, storage and distribution of food aid as directed by the Secretariat of the NDTF.
September 1992	Free food distribution program of the Namibian Red Cross is initiated from Khorixas and Opuwo. The program for water source protection is also initiated.
October 1992	On average and prior to this month, food rations were distributed to 176,000 beneficiaries per month. In October, the number of people assisted had risen to 220,000 persons and was expected to remain at that level through May 1993.
October 1992	First activities of the NDTF's Monitoring and Evaluation Unit are initiated and unit is staffed by one short-term consultant, one Namibian specialist seconded from the United Nations, and one officer from the Department of Planning, Marketing, Pricing and Co-operatives of the MAWRD. One expatriate advisor arrive to join the unit in November 1992 and was the only full-time officer in the unit until April 1993.
October 1992	Peace Corps drought relief Volunteers begin arriving in Namibia.
December 1992	Immunization coverage for measles among vulnerable groups reaches 74 percent by the end of 1992.
January 1993	First activity report is issued by the NDTF's Monitoring and Evaluation Unit
February 1993	Mid-term review of the Drought Relief Program.

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- February/March 1993** Government initiates subsidized ploughing and planting support programs in the northern areas of Namibia. Millet seed supplied by USAID through the SARP program is distributed.
- April 1993** NDTF's Monitoring and Evaluation Unit completes established of a system for monitoring food flows from the port to mills and then to regional warehouses.
- June 1993** As of the first of the month, Department of Water Affairs has completed laying 272 kilometers of new water pipelines. At a cost of Rand 3 million, 31 water tankers have covered a total distance of 1 million kilometers delivering water to schools, clinics and some of the most disadvantaged communities in the rural areas. Water bladders supplied by the United States are used in this effort.
- Of 510 requests for new boreholes received country-wide, 422 have been drilled, 291 have been successful, and 142 are fully installed. And, of the 76 requests for borehole rehabilitation, 55 have been tackled, 43 successfully.
- June 1993** Namibian Red Cross reassigns the field team doing free food distribution to Food for Work projects in the Kunene Region.
- August 1993** The GRN declares the 1992/1993 over.
- August 1993** Last of the Peace Corps drought relief Volunteers end their emergency service.
- September 1993** The GRN presents its final report on the 1992/1993 drought relief program at the SADC Regional Meeting in Harare.
- October 1993** The GRN through the NDTF issues its final report on the 1992/1993 drought relief program under the title "Drought, Once Again -- An Institutional Memory Compilation on the 1991-1993 Drought Emergency in Namibia and Details of the Drought Relief Programme". This report contains a National Needs Assessment for 1993/1994.

ANNEX E

COMPARISON OF FOOD SUPPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES AND TOTAL AMOUNTS SUPPLIED

Using Fiscal Year 1992 funds, the United States provided 10,000 metric tons of maize to Namibia under Section 416 of Public Law 480. This food contribution was valued at \$ 2,580,000. In addition to the food assistance, the United States provided the following non-food contributions:

Fiscal Year 1992 Funding

- An emergency relief coordinator at a cost of \$ 28,150.
- A grant from the Ambassador's Authority Fund for water projects at a cost of \$ 25,000.
- A grant to the International Medical Corps for the drilling of 20 boreholes at a cost of \$ 431,832.
- A grant to UNICEF for immunization and health programs at a cost of \$ 700,000.
- A grant to the American Red Cross for transfer to the Namibian Red Cross for provision of vitamin A and food distribution at a cost of \$ 51,350.

FY 1992 funding for non-food drought relief totalled \$ 1,236,332.

Fiscal Year 1993 Funding

- A grant to the International Medical Corps for the drilling of an additional 20 boreholes at a cost of \$ 277,739.
- A grant to the United States Peace Corps for purchase of computer equipment at a cost of \$ 3,000.

FY 1993 funding for non-food drought relief totalled \$ 280,739. Total non-food funding in the two years totalled \$ 1,517,071.

Donated food contributions and purchases by the GRN for vulnerable group feeding between July 1992 and April 1993 are shown in Table E-1 below. A total of 25,590 metric tons of maize were contributed by a consortium of donors, the GRN, NGOs and private companies. In addition, the European Community provided 10,000 metric tons of wheat for commercial sale, the proceeds of which were used to support the Namibian drought relief program.

In terms of donated maize contributions, the United States contributed 53.4 percent of the total. In terms of total cereals contributions and purchases by the GRN, the United States contributed 28.1 percent of the total. In addition to cereals contributions and purchases, donors, NGOs and the GRN provided the following food items: 1,027 metric tons of beans, 655 metric tons of edible oils, 462 metric tons of fish, 811 metric tons of soybean oil meal, 160 metric tons of salt, and 840 metric tons of sugar.

Table E-1
Donor Food Contributions and Purchases by the GRN for Vulnerable Group Feeding
(In thousands of metric tons)

Donor	Maize	Beans	Oil	Fish	DSM	Salt	Sugar
U.S.A. (WFP)	10						
Germany (WFP)	3	0.5					
United Kingdom (WFP)					0.240		
Netherlands (WFP)					0.571		
Japan	2						
Italy	3						
Germany (Red Cross)	0.723		0.145				
EEC		0.427	0.510	0.267			
Sweden (UNICEF)						0.160	0.840
GRN	6.867	0.1		0.128			
Namso				0.050			
Private Companies				0.017			
Total	25.59	1.027	0.655	0.462	0.811	0.160	0.840

Source: The National Drought Task Force. (October 1993). Drought, Once Again -- An Institutional Memory Compilation on the 1991-1993 Drought Emergency in Namibia and Details of the Drought Relief Programme. Government of the Republic of Namibia, Windhoek, Namibia, p. 31.

- Notes: 1/ In addition to the cereal contributions shown, the EEC provided 10,000 metric tons of wheat for commercial sale, the proceeds of which were used for the drought relief program.
- 2/ Figures shown for maize contributions by Germany through the Red Cross and the GRN represent maize meal purchased in Namibia. The actual amounts were 600 and 5,700 metric tons, respectively. These tonnages were converted to maize equivalent on the basis of a 83 percent extraction rate.
- 3/ Private companies included: Sea Harvest, Sea Flower Lobster Corporation, Japan Tuna Fisheries, United Fishing, Atlantic Harvesters, Namibia Sea Products, Namibia Fishing Industries, Mukorob and Luderitz Smokeries.
 *Pledges were also made by Overberg, Kuiseb and Namib Fisheries.

ANNEX F

MEMORANDUM TO AMBASSADOR MARSHALL McCALLIE AND THE
EMBASSY DROUGHT COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM

TO : Ambassador Marshall McCallie
THROUGH : Embassy Drought Committee
FROM : Ira Amstadter and John Eriksen, SADE Evaluation Team
SUBJECT : SADE Evaluation Team Observations on the Namibian Drought
Situation

I. INTRODUCTION

Since the SADE evaluation team's initial meeting with the Mission Drought Committee on Monday, 18 October, we have conducted a large number of interviews with a broad spectrum of GRN officials, representatives of donor and non-governmental organizations, private sector agents, and participants in drought relief programs. We have also had the opportunity to visit several sites outside Windhoek during a short field trip.

As you know, the SADE evaluation team has attempted to address two different agendas during its brief consultancy in Namibia. The first is the Scope of Work developed by the A.I.D. Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) for the southern Africa drought evaluation. The second, as contained in Reftel 93182 dated 8 October 1993, is a series of issues raised by your Committee with respect to Mission activities undertaken during the drought emergency.

II. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

A. Food Aid Issues

- The exceptional factor in southern Africa in 1992/93 was the pan-regional nature of drought conditions, not the specific conditions in Namibia. Had deficient rainfall conditions occurred only in Namibia, it is unlikely, in our opinion, that any massive donor response would have been warranted because vulnerable populations could have been rather easily accommodated with injection of supplementary local government resources into the existing commercial food delivery network.

- The GRN -- and the donor community -- analysts never really arrived at a common and sharply delineated definition of the Namibia's structural food deficit -- i.e., that deficit that Namibia should be expected to cope with as within the "normal" range of temporal and spatial distributions of annual rainfall and the subsequent performance of the domestic agricultural economy -- versus the deficit in available food stocks caused by truly exceptional drought situations. No common set of criteria were established to determine what constituted the structural deficit and what constituted an exceptional demand on the food system. In the absence of such criteria, there was no techno-economic basis for determining how much additional food should be imported into Namibia as drought relief -- i.e., over and above stocks which could have -- and should have -- been handled through normal commercial channels. Individual donor decisions about appropriate levels of food aid were, therefore, made primarily on political grounds.
- Political decisions about food aid were obviously complicated by the domestic situation of having drought conditions coincident with election campaigning in 1992 and by the decisions of some donors to "reward" the Namibian government for its generally positive performance since independence. In this instance, both donors and the GRN used the drought occurrence to further political objectives quite unrelated to the actual requirements for drought relief per se.
- The consensus among people interviewed by the SADE team was that, given a choice between donor importation of commodities for distribution or receipt of financial contributions from the donors to directly increase the purchasing power of targeted "vulnerable" groups through domestic commercial markets -- government receipt of financial grants would have been the preferred alternative. This alternative was seen as potentially less disruptive of existing commercial systems and more capable of supplying "vulnerable" Namibian consumers with a range of commodities in line with their own preferences.
- There was virtually unanimous consensus among donor and NGO representatives that the system for classifying "vulnerable" groups was much too complicated and inappropriate for the Namibian social context. Households share available food stocks among all members and do not usually prepare different diets for individual family members based upon age, sex or other criteria. Definition and distribution of different drought relief packages for different "vulnerable" groups was viewed as elegant in theory but unworkable in fact. The system was unworkable for three main reasons: (i.) there were too many individual commodities in the twenty-one packages specified for vulnerable groups; (ii.) organizations charged with the actual food distribution rarely had stocks of all of the commodities specified for the group packages on hand at the same time to pre-assemble packages; and (iii.) actual delivery of even partial packages to only the defined "vulnerable" recipients proved extremely difficult under field conditions.

- Attempts to organize and implement food for work activities (FFW) in Namibia under 1990 and 1992/93 drought conditions were generally acknowledged to have been failures -- the only possible exception being activities mounted by OXFAM Canada. In fact, only a very small percentage of the population deemed to be eligible for this type of food aid actually participated in FFW programs and the programs themselves were, in many cases, were judged to have been ill-conceived, hastily designed, poorly executed and of high cost per participant served.
- Donors on occasion supplied commodities deemed inappropriate or in direct competition with products produced in Namibia and available through commercial outlets. These included contributions of tinned and dried fish, cooking oil and beans, as well as the surplus commodities contributed by the United States from leftover Gulf War stocks.

B. Water and Resource Use Issues

- In the Namibian context, as elsewhere in Africa, water must be seen as an input into a resource management system and not as an objective in and of itself. In the absence of established, community-based resource management systems, indiscriminant development of water sources is highly likely to have adverse economic and environmental consequences for both local communities and the country as a whole.
- Development of water resources should not be undertaken primarily to accomplish short-term political objectives, but only in the context of long-term, well-articulated development programs.
- Careful development of local water resources for human consumption in highly targeted locations can be an appropriate component in a drought mitigation program. Conversely, however, the periodic absence of water supplies in areas that are clearly vulnerable to overgrazing and resource destruction by livestock should be seen as an opportunity to force reductions in grazing pressures. In a drought situation, the principal cause of livestock mortality is the insufficient forage resource. We are not convinced from our interviews to date that there are large areas of the country that cannot be utilized by livestock, at least on a seasonal basis, because of the absolute absence of water resources.
- During the period of the drought, government concentrated primarily on drilling of new boreholes and rehabilitation of existing boreholes. While some NGO programs tested alternative water development systems -- i.e., capped springboxes and hand pumps -- in some areas, overall there was a noticeable lack of diversity and creativity in approaching water development problems. In this regard, American government support for installation of additional boreholes during the drought unfortunately

reinforced the Namibian government's own emphasis on borehole development as the primary means of supplying water to both the human and livestock populations.

As a result of experience gained during the drought and with the reorganization of the Department of Water Affairs, the government now appears to be more willing to reassess its whole approach to water development in rural areas. If the American government wishes to involve itself in the evolution of a new water resources program in Namibia, a clear distinction should be made between development of potable water supplies for the human population and development of water resources as an input into improved livestock management systems.

C. Institutional Issues

- The government appears to have learned a great deal from their first emergency experience. Government organizations are in the process of being reorganized to better service the needs of the client groups in the communal areas and to react to specific technical problems which surfaced during the drought period. The drought relief effort forced greater inter-ministerial coordination within the government than had existed before and all evidence leads us to believe that this coordination will continue. This might be the most significant and beneficial consequence of the entire drought effort in Namibia.
- There appears to be a consensus among the interviewees that the formal government/donor/NGO coordination mechanism used did not facilitate sufficiently frequent or frank discussions of the major drought relief issues. In addition, several respondents indicated that, when meetings were held with the government, several of the participating donor representatives tended to be too passive and uncritical in responding to government presentations.
- Although informal contacts and discussions occurred between major donors and between individual donors and NGOs, the donor/NGO community as a whole never organized a formal forum independent of the government to discuss issues, arrive at common positions on those issues, and facilitate coordination between individual relief programs. Had this forum existed, some of the tensions which arose between implementors during the drought relief effort might have been negotiated before they were tabled in the larger government/ donor/NGO meetings and written up in SADC reports.
- There appears to have been a failure in government/donor/NGO discussions to arrive at a clear working distinction between activities appropriate in the context of an emergency drought relief effort and those activities with longer-term development objectives that would be better implemented with "programmed" food aid. This

deficiency is particularly true in the case of food for work activities, but is also evident with respect to water development schemes.

- Regional councils were given responsibilities for distribution of drought relief commodities but were not provided with financial resources to implement these distributions in a timely manner. In the future, devolution of drought relief program responsibilities to regional and local authorities must be accompanied with appropriate and timely financial transfers.
- If relief efforts are properly planned and implemented to address specific and short-term vulnerabilities caused by exceptional drought conditions, they are highly likely to be self-terminating and should not engender long-term dependencies among local constituencies. The greatest danger for creating dependencies exists when the government confuses short-term drought relief activities with longer-term development objectives and then seeks to capitalize upon the temporary emergency situation to further its development objectives.
- In drought needs assessments and subsequent relief program implementation, government and donor officials must pay greater attention to the porous nature of the Namibia/Angola border and the fact that food commodities and livestock regularly flow across the frontier in both directions in response to changes in annual rainfall patterns and differential economic conditions. These exchanges are facilitated by the presence of the same ethnic groups on both sides of the frontier.

III. PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Food Aid Issues

- Work with the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development's Directorate of Agricultural Planning, representatives of local milling companies, and other donor representatives to establish before the next drought occurrence clear and commonly agreed criteria for defining Namibia's structural food deficit.
- Having established the bounds of Namibia's structural food deficit, make it clear to the government that requests for drought emergency commodities will only be considered if evidence is given that Namibia has already made commitments to satisfy its structural deficit through normal commercial channels.
- If resources are available, consider using financial grants as part of any future drought relief program in Namibia to directly supplement the purchasing power of vulnerable households in domestic markets.

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- Offer technical assistance to the GRN to design and evaluate alternative systems for converting financial grants to the GRN into increased purchasing power for vulnerable households -- i.e., through the pension scheme, ration cards, food chits, etc..
- Encourage the GRN to redefine its criteria for assessing vulnerability in drought situations. Concentrate on defining vulnerable households within a community, rather than vulnerable individuals within a household.
- Encourage the GRN to supply standard household ration packages containing a maximum of four commodities.
- Avoid any involvement in local food for work programs unless the United States determines it has an interest in developing a long-term programmed food aid program in Namibia.
- In the absence of a demonstrated need for specific items, refrain from importing food commodities into Namibia simply because they happen to be available to American agencies on concessionary terms.

B. Water and Resource Use Issues

- Do not involve American agencies in the development of any new water points or water conveyance systems unless the water is delivered as input into a sound community-based or commercial resource management system.
- In the absence of sound area grazing schemes for livestock, any American involvement in rehabilitation of existing waterpoints should be strictly limited to developing improved potable water systems for the human population. Such systems should have appropriate mechanisms to restrict daily water flows to the requirements of the human population and ensure water quality.
- Consider technical assistance to the government or local NGOs to introduce and test alternative surface water capture and storage mechanisms -- i.e., capped springboxes, small catchment dams, percolation washes, hand pumps for shallow aquifers, etc..
- Require independent environmental impact assessments for all American-funded water development activities in Namibia.

C. Institutional Issues

- In the event of another major emergency requiring donor assistance, encourage the organization of a formal donor/multilateral agency/NGO forum to facilitate frank and open discussions between participants, negotiate disagreements, and coordinate activities between implementing agencies.

- Continue proactive efforts to supply farmers with improved, drought tolerant crop varieties appropriate to Namibian conditions and information on how to use these new seeds and plant materials effectively.
- Encourage the GRN to clearly distinguish in any emergency preparedness system between short-term activities appropriate to mitigating the emergency conditions and longer-term development activities.

Annex G: U.S. Peace Corps Involvement

The United States Peace Corps in Namibia undertook a special drought relief initiative to provide assistance in water supply and management activities as well as in food distribution at the community and national levels. The initiative was funded by OPDA with a budget of \$ 152,000 under which the services of 10 third-year Peace Corps Volunteers were provided to Namibia's drought relief program for ten to 12 months of service.

The drought relief Peace Corps Volunteers began arriving in Namibia in early October 1992 and after a brief orientation went to their posts. The initial eight Volunteers were in place by November 1992 and the final two reached their post in January 1993. Six Volunteers were assigned to the MAWRD's Department of Water Affairs as hydro-geologists.

Provision of these Volunteers enabled the Department of Water Affairs to fully staff the regional offices of its 14 Emergency Water Supply Units (EWSU). One of the Volunteers was assigned to Department of Water Affairs headquarters in Windhoek to assist in managing the EWSU program as a whole. The five water supply Volunteers were posted in the Caprivi, Omusati, Ohangwena, Oshana, Oshikoto and Omaheke regions.

As each region has particular water supply and management needs, the water Volunteers worked in a variety of areas such as the provision of technical assistance in determining drilling sites and installing boreholes, designing and installing community wells, conducting rural water supply needs assessments, assisting water extension activities, and installing or repairing water pipelines and pumps.

The two Volunteers working in the Omusati, Ohangwena, Oshana and Oshikoto regions conducted a survey of the over 300 boreholes in those regions in order to precisely locate them, determine whether the boreholes were functional and if not, what type of rehabilitation service they would require, determine the equipment that was available on site, and determine basic data about each borehole -- i.e., storage capacity, headworks, depth, number of users, etc..

The water Volunteers also set up a system of maintaining and updating information on a longer term basis. As a result, the Volunteers developed a computer database system to store and process borehole and groundwater data into various reporting forms. The system was also designed to facilitate additional modifications and processing of data in a standardized format. To facilitate information on accurate borehole location, the Volunteers wrote their own software package for use in mapping borehole coordinates used QBasic software. They also designed computerized survey and field report forms for standardized usage.

Two drought relief Volunteers were assigned to the FMLU headquarters in Windhoek to work as food distribution trainers to facilitate the training of regional food warehouse staff in management, computers, record keeping, logistics and administration. The two Volunteers were also involved in drafting national guidelines for the FFW program as well as in

implementing national training programs for regional FFW facilitators. The two other Volunteers working in the drought relief program were assigned to the Directorate of Rural Development of the MAWRD as facilitators for FFW activities in the regions.

The Volunteer working as the FFW facilitator in the Omusati, Ohangwena, Oshana and Oshikoto regions designed FFW information packets and training programs which are region-specific and have been translated into the local language and, as a result, have stimulated interest in the program to such an extent that 560 new project proposals have been submitted from the Ombalantu area alone.

All of the Volunteers who served in the DRP were experienced field personnel who transferred to Namibia after two or more years of successful service in other Peace Corps programs in Chad, Senegal, Guinea, Lesotho, Cape Verde, Jamaica and the Solomon Islands. They had diverse backgrounds in technical education and skills which included Ph.D., M.S. and B.S. degrees in civil engineering, environmental engineering and related fields. All six Volunteers assigned to the Department of Water Affairs as hydro-geologists had worked on rural water supply programs during their first two years of Peace Corps service and many were licensed engineers in the United States with water supply related work before signing up with the Peace Corps. The two Volunteers involved in food distribution logistics at the FMLU were community extension officers prior to their Peace Corps tour and had extensive experience in designing and facilitating community based training programs for adults.

Annex H: Statement of Work

SOUTHERN AFRICA DROUGHT EVALUATION

I. Background

Southern Africa faced one of the worst droughts in decades in 1992. The drought devastated crops, particularly maize, reduced scarce water availability in many areas and placed the lives of some 18 million people at risk from starvation and disease. In countries also affected by conflict or insecurity, the drought added to already catastrophic conditions, placing additional heavy burdens on people who could no longer cope with further adversity.

FAO/WFP crop and food supply assessment missions, in cooperation with the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), estimated that the aggregated cereal production of the ten drought-affected SADC countries had fallen to six million metric tons (MT); about half of the normal production in 1992/93. The cereal import requirement of these countries was estimated in March 1992 to be at a level of 6.1 million MT, compared with less than 2 million MT in a normal year.

In response to the drought, emergency food aid shipments to southern Africa have reached unprecedented levels. As of December 31, 1992, U.S. emergency food aid was 2.3 million MT valued at \$650 million for the region, an increase of over 1.4 million MT from previous years. Non-food emergency assistance also reached an all time high for the southern Africa region with FHA/OFDA providing over \$37 million and AFR/SA providing \$59.9 million through December 31, 1992.

The objective of relief assistance is to save lives. Evaluations of relief efforts thus must assess the achievements of the international relief community toward this overall goal. The U.S. contribution also needs to be placed into the context of the total international relief effort.

It is in this context that an assessment of the USG emergency program is conceived. This assessment will provide the opportunity to take stock of USG successes, lessons learned and deficiencies in delivering emergency assistance. It is hoped that this review will contribute to improving the effectiveness of USG emergency aid responses and will develop new models or document existing ones that can be used by other donors and host governments.

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II. Objectives

1. To provide data on the overall international relief effort including the validity of the initial assessments, the appropriateness of the response measures employed, the U.S. role in the international effort and, to the extent possible, a comparative analysis of this effort with past relief efforts of similar magnitude.
2. To assess the timeliness, appropriateness and impact of emergency food and non-food assistance to the Southern Africa Drought Emergency (SADE) and suggest means of improvement.
3. To assist USAID Missions, AID/Washington, private voluntary organizations (PVOs), host governments and other donors in programming future emergency, rehabilitation and disaster prevention activities and in improving Washington/field donor coordination by providing A.I.D. (and the donor community) with lessons learned regarding the planning, design, implementation and evaluation of emergency food and non-food relief programs.
4. To Identify conditions under which import mobilization and internal food distribution were both efficient and cost-effective in meeting drought response objectives.

III. Scope of Work

The following questions are illustrative of the kinds of issues that should be examined in depth by the team in carrying out the objectives of this evaluation. Emphasis, of course, will vary from country to country and will depend on the particular type of intervention being examined and the degree of severity of the emergency situation. Priority should be given to information gathering and analysis leading to improved programming, design and exploration of new options for the formulation of emergency food and non-food relief programs.

A. Causes of the Emergency

- o Food deficit due to the drought emergency in southern Africa.
- o To what extent was the country's food problem related to agricultural and macroeconomic policies that may discourage local agricultural production and marketing rather than the drought? Has the drought caused any tangible change in agricultural policies?

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B. Host Country Preparedness and Contingency Planning

- o Do national procedures exist in the affected countries for responding to emergencies? Are they followed when an actual emergency occurs?
- o How did the internal and external coordination of the drought response affect the overall efficiency, impact and cost-effectiveness of each country's drought emergency response?
- o Identify what combination of public and private sector roles led to appropriate, timely, efficient and cost-effective responses by both host country governments and donors.
- o Describe the types and levels of public and private sector security stocks, distribution mechanisms and how they were used, if they were used, in the disaster situation.
- o What planning activities could be undertaken to strengthen the capacity of the affected country's government to respond more effectively to structural and emergency food deficit situations?
- o Review drought prevention/mitigation actions: farming practices, crop diversification, soil/water conservation measures, food security stocks, storage/transport losses, seed production, etc.
- o How does the local population normally deal with food shortages and how can this traditional coping behavior be reinforced?
- o How effective were the early warning systems/weather forecasting services (FEWS project, etc.)? Will these systems remain in place for the future? Will SADC install an early warning system as part of its activities?
- o What was/is the impact of pests (army worms/locusts) and plant disease?

C. Donor Coordination

- o How effective were the USG early warning systems and coordination?
- o Were adequate mechanisms (including telecommunications systems) in existence or were they established to coordinate assessments of donor requirements and implementation efforts?

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- o How successful was the U.N. World Food Programme and the U.N. Department of Humanitarian Assistance in coordinating assistance, delivering assistance, etc. and how did they interact with each other and other groups responding to the drought?
- o What was the role and responsibilities of international, U.S. and/or local non-governmental organizations/private voluntary organizations?
- o How do donors' methodologies for calculating food and non-food needs and their system for reporting on food deliveries, donor pledges, etc. relate to those of the UN? Are they adequate?
- o What were the successes and failures of donor coordination and the role of donor meetings and appeals.
- o What was the role of SADC and was it effective in responding to the drought needs of the member countries?
- o What was the role of South Africa? How well did cooperation among regional transport authorities work, and what factor influenced the success of those efforts? Did early estimates of South African port and rail capacity overestimate the difficulties of handling projected food imports? If so, why?
- o What role did WFP play in transport coordination?

D. Needs Assessment

- o What were the types of information collection system (e.g., rainfall analysis, nutrition surveillance), analysis procedures and use of data for early warning, assessment of requirements, declaration of disaster, design of programs, estimation of food input, etc. used by A.I.D., the UN, host governments?
- o Was the logistical capacity of the government, USAID and the private sector adequately taken into account in determining food aid levels?
- o Evaluate the accuracy, rapidity, integrity and appropriateness of A.I.D.'s needs assessment process?
- o Was there any effort to monitor prices in the local market as a measure of determining food shortages?

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E. Project Design

- o How were the target areas and groups of beneficiaries selected?
- o Describe the demographics of the beneficiary population. Did the majority of food and/or non-food assistance go to a specific group (e.g., farmers, urban poor, displaced persons, refugees)?
- o Were local food preferences and food consumption patterns of the target population as well as local market prices adequately considered in the choice of commodities and the selection of distribution systems?
- o Which mechanism was the most effective in providing food aid to the beneficiary (WFP, host government, FVO, etc.) Did this vary based on the type of beneficiary; e.g., getting food to markets versus targeted feeding?
- o By the type of recipient (malnourished children, adults, etc.) which type of food aid implementation was the most effective (FFW, general distribution, targeted feeding, etc.)
- o Were necessary complementary inputs (i.e., seeds, vaccines, materials, technical assistance, environmental impacts assessments) incorporated into the food emergency program?
- o To what extent had participation of beneficiaries and utilization of already existing organizational structures/resources, particularly local non-governmental organizations, been built into responses?
- o How can the basic food problem best be addressed with emergency food aid? With commercial?
- o How were costs a factor in the design of the emergency response program? What budget limits, if any, were established by the respective host government(s)?
- o Were provisions for termination of emergency food aid and/or transition to rehabilitation and longer term development foreseen during the planning stages?
- o Were linkages with regular food and non-food aid programs and other complementary resources explored?
- o Were disincentives introduced by the provision of massive quantities of PL 480 food?

F. Management, Monitoring and Evaluation

- o Did the host governments, UN, USAID Missions, AID/W, PVOs and local community groups effectively organize themselves to manage the emergency? How vigilant were these groups in protecting themselves from becoming overextended? What emphasis was placed on institution-building and the enhancement of local resourcefulness? Did they utilize guidelines for assessing environmental impacts? Were these guidelines effective? What was the role of the Peace Corps and other USG agencies? How did the different Bureaus within A.I.D. interact? What was the role and utility of the Southern Africa Drought Task Force? Discuss in terms of relief planning, organization, resource allocation (the Africa Disaster Assistance Account), postcrisis rehabilitation and longer term sustainability.
- o What are the policies/practices of local governments and donors in the management, monitoring and evaluation of emergency programs and what was their varying impacts on large commercial farmers and small, subsistence farmers?
- o How can management, monitoring, oversight and evaluation be improved?

G. Timeliness of Emergency Response

- o Discuss the effectiveness and quantify the exact time frames for the following:
 - Needs assessment
 - Approval process for food and non-food projects considered
 - Procurement of commodities
 - Delivery of commodities to the country
 - Internal distribution of food and non-food aid to the target population
 - Arrival of technical assistance
- o Describe constraints, i.e. logistical/organizational /political bottlenecks, and how and if they were overcome. Was the WFP regional logistical unit in Harare and its subset in Johannesburg effective? Suggest ways of expediting these procedures in the future. Was private sector transport, handling and storage used effectively in

the response to the drought and, if not, how can it be improved?

- o If food commodities arrived late, were appropriate actions taken to avoid disincentive effects on local production and marketing?

H. Program Results

To the extent possible and, taking into account the constraints inherent in disaster situations, the evaluation team will present evidence of the effectiveness/impact of emergency interventions in terms of the following:

- o **Targeting:** extent to which areas and/or victims with greatest need are being reached. Was better targeting achieved as the drought progressed?
- o **Appropriateness and adequacy of USG food and non-food intervention.** Were resources allocated appropriately for maximum effectiveness?
- o **Coverage:** percentage of the affected population being assisted (by the United States, by other donors)
- o **Increased availability of food in target areas and consumption by vulnerable groups**
- o **Incentive/disincentive effects on agricultural production/prices/incomes**
- o **Improved nutritional and health status of target groups**
- o **Decreased infant and child mortality**
- o **Demographic effects:** population movements to centers and urban areas, age/sex distribution, etc.
- o **Dependency/self-reliance:** Have the relief programs weakened the self-help capacity of individuals and community groups? How can programs be organized better to reempower individuals and strengthen local decision-making and resource generation/productivity?
- o **Policy and institutional reform:** How has the emergency affected ongoing food strategy plans and price restructuring efforts? How has the emergency intervention strengthened the capacity of the national and local governments as well as local NGOs to respond more effectively to future emergencies?

I. Policy Issues

The following issues are complex and deserve separate studies in themselves. They are extremely important in thinking about programming options and will provide a useful backdrop for discussions and future interventions. As appropriate, the team should address these concerns in the context of recommendations for program improvement/redesign and lessons learned:

- o Relative effectiveness (impact and costs) of various distribution modes (e.g., general free distribution, maternal and child health, supplementary feeding programs, food for work, monetization, triangular transactions, rehabilitation activities), consideration of alternative distribution mechanisms and the extent of the relief effort's decentralization/regionalization.
- o Comparative advantage and cost-effectiveness of different food distribution channels (WFP, PVOs, host governments) and criteria for selecting among them.
- o Linkages with regular food aid program and other development assistance activities, how to use them to prepare better for future emergencies as well as to assess the effect a disaster has on them in the short term. This includes the following:
 - a. What effect do emergency activities have on the Mission's regular program and their strategic objectives? Should we consider these "on hold" while an emergency takes place? Should funding for them be decreased and moved toward the emergency?
 - b. How should disasters affect the composition of the Mission program? Should the Strategic Objectives in their regular development program take this into account and, if not, why?
 - c. Can ongoing activities be redirected to assist the drought? To what extent should they?
- o The capacity and ability of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to act independently of political constraints.
- o How food emergency programs can be planned to support sector and macroeconomic policy reforms and strengthen food self-reliance, disaster prevention and longer term development initiatives.
- o Criteria for determining when and emergency programs should be phased in and out.

- o The role that donor coordination (food and non-food needs assessments, standardized methodologies, centralized assistance/pledge information) does/should play in maximizing the effectiveness of emergency responses.

IV. Evaluation Approach and Duration

During the first week of the assessment, the Contractor will draft scopes of work for team participants. All team members then will meet in Washington, D.C., to review and clarify the scopes of work, develop field protocols for site visits and for interviews with local officials and program participants, as well as to hold discussions with key A.I.D., USDA, State Department and PVO officials in Washington.

After this prefield analysis is completed, the teams will proceed to the southern Africa region, as coordinated by the Contract's Chief of Party, to carry out field investigations: review additional documentation, interview key U.S. Mission personnel, host government, PVO and other donor officials and inspect appropriate field sites. Specific attention should be devoted to capturing the perceptions of program participants, either through structured interviews or informal conversations in their own language. The field work will be carried out in approximately 36 working days per team member. For Mozambique the field work will be carried out in approximately 20 working days per team member.

While in the field all logistical support costs will be provided by the contractor and not by the Missions. This includes travel and transportation (surface and air), lodging, office space, office equipment and supplies, etc.

The teams will inform the Mission of the countries and areas that will be considered.

Upon return from the field, each team will review its findings and will prepare a draft country report. When all the country studies have been completed, Mission comments received and the final reports prepared, the Contractor's core technical staff will prepare a synthesis of findings and recommendations, drawing out lessons learned about what works, what does not work and why, from both the operational and policy perspectives.

AID/Washington and USAID Missions would be expected to collect all existing data and reports and other relevant records for the team before their arrival to the countries being identified. To the extent possible, USAID Missions should provide logistical support for the team while in-country.

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Total duration of the evaluation will be approximately three months with a target completion date of September 21, 1993.

V. Country Selection

All drought-affected countries in the southern Africa region, including South Africa and excluding Angola, which received USG food and/or non-food assistance will be assessed. The region will be broken into four areas, each of which will be visited by one team, as follows: 1) Zimbabwe and South Africa, 2) Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia, 3) Zambia and Malawi, and 4) Mozambique.

VI. Team Composition and Level of Effort

In conducting these country assessments, the contractor will provide at least four teams of specialists; one team for each of the areas specified above. Given the range of skills required to carry out this scope of work and the short time frame, the background of these specialists will vary, but all of the following areas of expertise must be represented:

- Language skills and country-specific experience
- Agricultural economics
- Public health/nutrition
- Rural Water
- Social Anthropology
- Food Logistics
- PL 480 Program Regulations and WFP Procedures
- Policy analysis/program design/evaluation
- UN System
- Disaster Management

The team leaders will be on the contractor's core technical staff. While continuity in the evaluation team is assumed, it is not essential for the same consultants to go to all the countries.

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VII. Reports

The team will submit a report on each country as well as a synthesis containing an analysis of those factors that appear to determine program effectiveness, recommendations on how A.I.D. can improve its programming of emergency food aid and non-food aid and lessons learned. Before departure from each country, the team will have engaged the USAID in a dialogue concerning their findings and recommendations. The draft country reports are due to AID/Washington no later than two weeks after each team has returned to the United States. Fifty copies will be delivered. The Missions will be asked to complete their reviews and respond with comments by cable within two weeks of receiving the draft. The Contractor will conduct a debriefing in Washington for AID and all interested parties within one month of the return of all teams. The final report (including an executive summary and synthesis of findings, recommendations and lessons learned) will be completed by the Contractor within two weeks of receiving all Mission comments. Fifty copies of this report will be delivered to FHA/OFDA, who will distribute them to all interested parties including FHA/FFP, AFR/SA, SADTF, LEG, CDIE and InterAction.

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